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I. INTRODUCTION 
With increasing frequency, courts, legislators, and particu-
larly commentators explicitly consider issues of power in the 
many human interactions the law addresses. These discussions 
of "the power relationship," of "empowerment," or of "disem-
powerment" respond to dissatisfaction with the legal system and 
with particular legal doctrines.1 The prevalence of such scholar-
ship, statutes, and case opinions suggests a need for careful ex-
amination of the bases or contours of power. This examination 
has not occurred. Power is assumed to be a unitary, self-evident 
concept.2 The potential and actual harm caused by the use, pos-
session, and lack of power captures the scholarly, legislative, and 
judicial attention. 
We view human power much as we view electrical power. 
Only the end products of electrical power are important to us, 
such as lighting for courtrooms, offices, and classrooms. The 
1. See infra notes 26-71 and accompanying text. 
2. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 12, at 61 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that power is relevant to the emotional distress 
doctrine without defining or explaining the term "power"). Those authors who recog-
nize that power may not be either unitary or self-evident, nevertheless, present only 
limited visions of power. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The 
Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177, 194-207 n.25 (1994) (listing five 
"bases" of power without explanation or examination); Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's 
Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553, 
574-75 (1995) (inventing five power "areas"). Neither Bryan nor Hughes actually de-
velops or justifies a model of power, and both fail to explore the larger implications of 
their ideas about power. 
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process of how electrical power works-the force of attraction 
created when an electron and proton are brought close to each 
other3-is irrelevant to us. Similarly, we know human power 
matters because we can see the products of human power's oper-
ation: constriction of the spectrum of political and legal discus-
sion, unfair contractual bargains, subjugation, discrimination, 
battered women, low-quality justice, and harassment of persons 
who possess relatively little power. The discourse on human 
power, with its focus on the products of power, seldom confronts 
the sources of the exercised power. 
This Article analyzes the sources of power. Specifically, I 
weave together ideas from the fields of law, psychology, and phi-
losophy to create a multidimensional model of power. I then 
demonstrate the usefulness of the model for legal analysis and 
for legal systems analysis. I begin my analysis by situating my 
model in the context of current legal, psychological, and philo-
sophical thinking regarding the nature of power. 
A. The Nature of Power 
Even though power is perceived as important and influen-
tial in human interactions and experiences, there is no genuine 
consensus of what power is.4 Nearly all theorists who have dis-
cussed power, however, have suggested a particular vision. 
Power theorists may be seen as being part of one of two camps, 
"the traditional camp" and the "Foucauldian camp." Although 
traditional theorists focus mostly on interpersonal power and 
Foucauldians focus mostly on social power, each implicates the 
other. The real difference between the two camps is in the as-
pects of power they examine. Foucauldians focus on the effectiv-
ity or operationality of power, whereas traditionalists focus on 
the source of power. The model presented here draws from both 
camps. 
Theorists in the traditional camp, many of whom are social 
psychologists or have been influenced by the large body of social 
psychology power scholarship, view power mostly as a personal 
3. CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 664 (Sybil P. Parker ed., 
1987). 
4. James T. Tedeschi & Thomas U. Bonoma, Power and Influence: An Introduc-
tion, in THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE PROCESS 1, 2-8 (James T. Tedeschi ed., 1972). 
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property.5 Although the actual phrasing of this idea changes de-
pending on the theorist's linguistic preference, typically power is 
defined as the capacity to secure compliance against another's 
will.6 There are three key ideas to the traditional camp's under-
standing of power: (1) power is a personal faculty; (2) power 
reflects a potential for obtaining desired ends through its use; 
and (3) power implies an ability to obtain the compliance of an-
other, contrary to that other's preferences.7 
Thus, to these theorists, power means interpersonal power. 
The idea of interpersonal power, however, implicates social 
power. By the term "interpersonal power," traditional theorists 
(at least recent commentators) communicate something broader 
than the simple person-to-person power relationship. The term 
also includes any relationship between one person, group, or or-
ganization and any other person, group or organization.8 Thus, 
traditional theorists believe that power resides in individuals, 
groups, or organizations and involves the potential to exact a de-
sired response from other individuals, groups, or organizations. 
Those in the other camp believe, as Michel Foucault argues, 
that "[p]ower is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recov-
ered . . . it only exists in action. . . . Power . . . is above all a 
relation of force. "9 Foucauldian theorists believe that power 
constructs reality through a pervasive social discourse, expressed 
5. See, e.g., Arthur J. Jacobson, Modem American Jurisprudence and the Problem 
of Power, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 713 (1985); David Kipnis, The Use of Power in Organiza-
tions and in Interpersonal Settings, 5 APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. ANN.: APPLICATION IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS 179 (Stuart Oskemp ed., 1984); Bertram H. Raven, A 
Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence: French and Raven Thirty Years 
Later, 7 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 217 (1992). 
6. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4. BARRY BARNES, THE NATURE OF PowER 
20 (1988) ("Power is the generalized capacity to secure the performance of political 
obligations, and serves as an exchange medium in a system of specific capacities to 
secure the performance of political obligations."); Henry L. Muiton, Power and Person-
ality, in THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE PROCESS, supra note 4, at 100-01 ("Power can be con-
ceptualized as the ability to overcome resistance in the course of obtaining intended 
effects."). 
7. I regard any performance in compliance with another's will as contrary to one's 
own will because the motivation for the performance is not self-generated. 
8. See, e.g., Raven, A Power/Interaction Model, supra note 5, at 235 (discussing 
hospitals' efforts to influence hospital staff); Anthony T. Cobb, Informal Influence in 
the Formal Organization: Psychological and Situational Correlates, 11 GROUP & 0RG. 
STUD., 229, 234 (1986) (noting the intersection of interpersonal and work group power). 
9. Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in PowERIKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTER· 
VIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 89 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980). 
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as a set of truths, needs, images, and ideas.10 Power, therefore, is 
a complex, mobile, collective force that at least appears to set 
boundaries of what is possible in society and is only truly mean-
ingful in its exercise. 
According to Allan Hutchinson, the traditional theorists' fo-
cus on interpersonal manifestations of power "obscures its more 
subtle and pervasive dimensions. "11 As Hutchinson recognizes, 
however, interpersonal interactions do matter, even under a 
Foucauldian analysis. He argues that power operates "not only 
through discursive practices ... but also through roles assigned 
and assumed in social practices. "12 Foucault suggests that the 
relationship between pervasive social power and interpersonal 
interactions is even more complicated than Hutchinson indi-
cates. According to Foucault, power is omnipresent "because it 
is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or, 
rather, in every relation from one point to another."13 More im-
portantly, power occurs in human interactions: "Power is every-
where; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes 
from everywhere. "14 
In short, interpersonal power cannot be separated from per-
vasive social power and discursive practices. Instead, pervasive 
social power and discursive practices are imbricated with inter-
personal power and vice-versa. In each human interaction, con-
versation, writing, and reading, both interpersonal power and 
pervasive social power operate dependently, independently, se-
quentially, and nonsequentially. Each is, establishes, manifests, 
and reinforces the other.15 
The link between interpersonal and pervasive social power 
10. Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation (With Sug-
gestions on How to Make Bouillabaisse), 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 877 (1985). See also 
Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL.L. REv. 813, 818 
(1992) (arguing that through repetition, the dominant stories, narratives, myths, and 
symbols become accepted as true depictions of the world). 
11. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 875. 
12. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 881 (emphasis added). Although I generally 
agree with Hutchinson on this point, I believe his analysis is incomplete. I do not per-
ceive such a clear demarcation between interpersonal interactions and discursive prac-
tices. To me, each makes and is made by the other, so much so that a beginning and an 
end are indecipherable. 
13. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 94 (Robert Hurley trans., 
1978) (emphasis added). 
14. /d. 
15. Although I believe the imbrication of interpersonal power and pervasive so-
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stems from the automatic process by which interpersonal power 
is exercised. The exercise of power often occurs on subtle, sub-
conscious levels. Contrary to the assertions of many traditional 
theorists that power is exercised volitionally and consciously,16 
power often is communicated, understood, and exercised with-
out intent or awarenessP For example, imagine that a middle-
aged, able-bodied, white male enters the room in which you are 
reading this Article. Even as this image enters your mind, you 
form conclusions about his power in our society based solely on 
his age, skin color, sex, and ability to walk. The mental "train-
ing" we have received from a lifetime of images, slogans, and 
ideas confers and exercises the man's interpersonal power with-
out his saying a word. His power is exercised automatically. 
In this sense, every human interaction is power-mediated. 
We send messages about our power through our physical charac-
teristics, the way we move, our tone of voice, the words we use, 
misuse, and choose not to use, the clothes we wear, the items we 
display in our offices, and countless other details of our exist-
ence. Moreover, each power-mediated interaction between an 
individual, group, or organization and another individual, group, 
or organization recapitulates, reinforces, and re-establishes the 
power story.18 Each time we experience an interpersonal power 
cial power helps perpetuate the existing social structure, I do not purport to address, in 
this Article, how that mechanism works. 
16. See, e.g., Bertram H. Raven & Arie W. Kruglanski, Conflict And Power, in 
THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT 69, 69-70 (Paul Swingle ed., 1970); Kipnis, supra note 5, 
at 184. 
17. Steven Winter makes a similar point in his recent insightful discussion of 
power from a fairly strict Foucauldian perspective. Steven L. Winter, The 'Power' 
Thing, 82 VA. L. REv. 721, 830-32 (1996) (arguing that power relations are an "inter-
pretive institution" influenced by "inequalities in access to resources and legitimate 
powers ... [and) [i]nequalities in psychological and emotional states"). 
18. My experience as a law professor inclined to minimize the power imbalance 
between my students and me illustrates the pervasiveness and subtle operation of both 
discursive social power and interpersonal power. For several years now, I have asked 
my students to refer to me by my first name and have promised to refer to them by 
whatever name they chose. I believed this practice addressed (in a small way) some of 
the power imbalance. In fact, the assertion of interpersonal power imbedded in my 
policy very likely served to enhance my power. By acknowledging my power to control 
both their manner of addressing me and my manner of addressing them, I reinforced 
my power. In fact, by insisting they call me by my first name, I may have disempowered 
those whose educational experiences or cultural values made them feel uncomfortable 
with my preference for informal address. 
Also, the policy seems to suggest that I am somehow different from their other 
professors. This suggestion also enhanced my power because it was a misleading sug-
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interaction (and such experiences occur many times a day), we 
deliver a message of acquiescence to the power-mediated nature 
of that interaction. In fact, even a protest of the power in an 
interaction acknowledges and, arguably, reinforces the power-
mediated nature of the interaction.19 This process of automatic 
exercise coupled with automatic assent places interpersonal 
power interactions at the core of the concern about power. In-
terpersonal power, therefore, is, manifests, re-establishes, and 
reinforces pervasive social power. 
From this perspective, power is a socially constructed and 
mediated capacity that is manifest and immanent throughout all 
human experience; and all human experience operates through 
small interpersonal power interactions. Because power operates 
in such a complex, often unseen yet large and varied tableau, a 
unitary meaning of "power" makes no sense. Instead, it makes 
more sense to regard power as multidimensional. Accordingly, 
to capture the complexity of power, this Article articulates a 
multidimensional model of power. 
B. Overview of Article 
In Part II of this Article, I elaborate on the importance of 
power to law, to society, and to each individual in society. First, 
I argue that power is important because it intersects with the law 
in at least four important ways: (1) power relations are a specific 
doctrinal consideration for certain legal issues; (2) power under-
lies or should underlie the analysis of other doctrinal issues; 
(3) law and lawmaking are a discourse about and a means to 
enforce and maintain power; and (4) power and empowerment 
are standards by which our governmental and legal systems can 
be measured. Second, I argue that power is important because it 
gestion. Students typically perceive grading as their most important interaction with 
their professors. I, like all their professors, intended to grade their work; therefore, I 
would be helping to place them in the artificial hierarchy created by my school's grading 
system. As I suggest in Part III of this Article, misleading is a technique for obtaining 
and preserving power. 
19. See generally EVE K. SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLosET 10 (1990) 
(arguing that a deconstructive analysis of power is not sufficient, standing alone, to 
disable the power involved). Sedgwick believes that such an analysis is "necessary." /d. 
This Article reflects my belief that identification of power is necessary, and application 
of my ideas about power to the existing structure of unconscionability doctrine is my 
attempt to make the analysis of power a disabling force, even within the current legal 
structure. 
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is a means of maintaining social control. Finally, I argue that 
power is important because Western psychologists perceive 
power as a basic human need, and also because a powerholder is 
likely to abuse her power.20 
In Part III of this Article, I describe and explain the model 
of power I have developed. I look to the considerable body of 
social psychology research and theory, and I create a model of 
power that is a synthesis, expansion, and reorganization of these 
works in light of the Foucauldian insight into the nature of 
power. At the core of this model is my perspective on the link 
between Foucauldian ideas of pervasive, discursive social power 
and traditional ideas of interpersonal power. I argue that inter-
personal power is a complex interaction of the following vec-
tors:21 (1) enfranchisement, (2) force, (3) social customs (based 
on status, social norms, values, traditions, and personal associa-
tions), (4) compact (based on giving or taking away things of 
value to the target), (5) information (knowledge that has persua-
sive force), (6) expertise (from education, training, or experi-
ence), (7) reference (from a desire by the target for social 
acceptance and identification by and with the powerholder), 
(8) perceived trustworthiness of the powerholder, (9) personal 
qualities (such as charisma, determination, and calmness), and 
(10) manipulation. An eleventh vector, discourse power, can be 
seen as a vector of power, as a tool of powerholders, and/or as a 
product of power relations. These vectors intersect, interact, and 
overlap. In any interpersonal relationship, the vectors may 
change in strength and direction over time. Part III of this Arti-
cle concludes with a discussion of the limitations and qualifica-
tions inherent in this and in any other model of a human 
experience such as power. 
20. As reflected in my choice of the word "her" here, this Article uses tradition-
ally female pronouns where gender is wholly neutral. However, in several instances, I 
use male pronouns where gender is ostensibly neutral because such choice is relevant to 
my analysis, such as in my discussion of the gender of those who commit sexual harass-
ment. Those who commit sexual harassment overwhelmingly are male. 
This Article uses the term "target" for the person(s) who are subject{s) of power 
exploitation, and the term "powerholder" for the person(s) who possess and/or seek to 
exploit their power vector(s). My selection and use of this terminology is for conven-
ience sake only and is not intended to communicate that power always (or even usually) 
is asserted by a conscious, volitional act or expression. 
21. See infra Part III(A){l) for an explanation of why I use the term "vectors" as 
opposed to more common legal terms such as "factors" or "elements" or common so-
cial psychology terms such as "bases of power" or "influence tactics." 
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Part IV of this Article is designed to show how the model 
can be used to enrich legal analysis and thinking. I discuss two 
apparently unrelated and vastly different areas where power is 
significant: (1) the use of power as a doctrinal consideration in 
the law of unconscionability, and (2) the power, empowerment, 
and disempowerment22 issues with respect to arbitration23 as a 
method of dispute resolution. By applying the model in two 
such divergent legal constructs, I suggest the potential of this 
model to enhance legal thinking in a variety of contexts and 
ways. 
I selected unconscionability doctrine as an example for two 
reasons: (1) Unconscionability is one of the few areas of law 
where the explicit analysis of power is a doctrinal requirement; 
and (2) the law of unconscionability, although relatively new, is 
well-developed and has been the subject of considerable schol-
arly commentary.24 I selected arbitration for inclusion in this 
Part because there is no explicit doctrinal recognition of the 
power issues in arbitration, and it seems unlikely that power ever 
will be a major consideration in arbitration doctrine. Instead, 
power and empowerment are significant to our analysis of arbi-
tration because they are standards by which the efficacy of arbi-
tration as a means of dispute resolution can be assessed. 
Moreover, almost nothing has been written about power and 
empowerment as they relate specifically to arbitration.25 This 
Part of the Article is intended to augment the assessment of the 
efficacy of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution by raising 
22. By the term "empowerment," I mean the conferring of power as that term is 
used in this Article. By the term "disempowerment," I mean the divesting, in whole or 
in part, of power. 
23. This Article uses the term "arbitration" to refer to any court adjudication-like 
procedure that occurs outside the formal court system in which a person or an arbitra-
tion panel has the power to make a final, binding decision subject only to limited court 
review (for overt bias, fraud, etc.). 
24. See, e.g., M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 
(1969); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New 
Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 1 (1981); John E. Murray, 
Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PnT. L. REv. 1 (1969). 
25. Scholars who have written about power in connection with Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution ("ADR") either have lumped all forms of ADR together in an over-
arching analysis of the power issues of ADR or have addressed power as a 
consideration in evaluating or conducting one particular form of ADR-mediation. See 
infra notes 348-361 and accompanying text. 
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and applying empowerment as a standard by which arbitration 
can be critiqued. 
Three themes emerge from these efforts: (1) Interpersonal 
power matters because it is so pervasive that it mediates our ex-
perience with the world; (2) if we decide to consider power in 
any way, a complex, multidimensional vector model of power is 
a useful tool with which to begin; and (3) we can enrich and im-
prove our consideration of the power issues raised by individual 
legal doctrines and by the legal system as a whole by viewing 
power in such a way. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE oF PowER 
Power is an important construct because: (1) Power perva-
sively intersects with the law; (2) power maintains social control, 
aside from power's intersection with the law; and (3) power has 
significant interpersonal meaning and effects-power is per-
ceived as a basic human need, and the abuse of power is per-
ceived to harm both the powerholder and her target(s). Power, 
therefore, is a core human institution, commanding the attention 
of legal scholars, philosophers, and psychologists because of its 
influence on all human relations. 
A. The Intersection of Power and the Law 
Power issues permeate the law. First, the consideration of 
power and power relationships is an explicit doctrinal principle 
in some areas of the law. Second, in those doctrinal areas in 
which power is not explicitly considered, the failure to consider 
power often is either an exercise of or, at least, a reflection of 
power issues. Third, law is a means by which power is main-
tained; expressions of law in cases, statutes, and regulations are 
both expressions of power and discourses about power. Fourth, 
power is a standard by which the legal system can be measured. 
In short, power and law intersect, overlap, and interact; law can-
not be considered without also considering power. 
1. Power as a Specific Consideration in Contemporary Legal 
Doctrine 
Power is explicitly considered an issue in several contexts. 
Explicit analysis of power issues can be seen in contract doc-
trines such as unconscionability, undue influence, and duress; in 
78 WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:67 
tort emotional distress doctrine; and in equality-related issues 
such as sexual harassment and antidiscrimination law. 
a. Power in Contract Doctrine 
Traditionally, grossly unfair contractual bargains loosely 
were policed through a forced and somewhat disguised focus on 
"contract defenses"26 or through the refusal of courts of equity 
to specifically enforce unfair bargainsP Now, most jurisdictions 
recognize that if an imbalance in the parties' relative interper-
sonal power ("gross inequality of bargaining power") results in 
an unreasonably one-sided bargain, enforcement of the contract 
should be denied or curtailed.28 Thus, power is given explicit 
status as a consideration in the courts' assessment of contracting 
parties' requests for relief.29 
Similarly, the doctrines of undue influence and duress have 
been expanded to reflect a recognition that power operates in 
human relations in complex and unseen ways. Duress, for exam-
ple, once applied only where a party used or threatened to use 
actual force or imprisonment to obtain contractual assent.30 In 
the past century, the doctrine of duress has been expanded to 
include other forms of coercion, particularly economic coer-
cion.31 Accordingly, duress has been found where a person who 
· was not a party to a transaction obtained a lien right from the 
contracting parties by exploiting the contracting parties' need to 
close the transaction,32 and where one party to a contract ex-
ploited the other's desperate and immediate need for perform-
ance to negotiate a new and more favorable bargain.33 Thus, as 
26. See generally Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's 
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967). 
27. See REsTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 367 (1932). See, e.g., Miller v. Coffeen, 
280 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1955) (denying specific performance because contract considera-
tion was inadequate). 
28. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF CoNTRAcrs § 208 (1981}. 
29. Leff, supra note 26, at 537-41. See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
30. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JosEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAw oF CoNTRAcrs § 9-2, at 
336-37 (3d ed. 1987). 
31. /d. § 9-6, at 346-47. 
32. Fizzell v. Meeker, 339 F. Supp. 624 (W.O. Mo. 1970). 
33. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102-03 (9th Cir. 1902) (rescis-
sion of contract price increase granted where fish packers refused to pack fish when 
packing company could not find replacement packers in time to avoid spoilage of its 
fish); Capps v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 253 Or. 248, 453 P.2d 935 (1969) (exploitation of the 
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Clare Dalton asserts, the real concern of duress is abuse of 
power. 34 The rise of the doctrine of economic duress is simply a 
recognition that power may be abused (i.e., coercion may occur) 
without resort to force or threats of force. 
Undue influence doctrine has undergone a similar expan-
sion. Traditionally, a finding of undue influence required show-
ing that the parties were in a confidential relationship.35 
Recently, however, undue influence has been found where one 
party exploited another party's "weakness of spirit," caused by 
physical exhaustion and emotional turmoil, through the use of 
excessive pressure tactics, such as negotiating the contract in an 
inappropriate setting and insisting that the other party decide 
immediately without consulting an advisor.36 This expansion 
reveals the concern addressed by the doctrine of undue influence 
is exploitation and/or dominance (i.e., power). Undue influence 
occurs when one party exploits the weakness of another party 
(produced either by the natural relaxation of vigilance when 
dealing with a person one trusts or by one's traumatic exper-
iences or fragile psyche) to the first party's gain. 
b. Power in Emotional Distress Doctrine 
Courts addressing tort claims of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress also explicitly consider power. According to 
Prosser and Keeton, the extreme and outrageous conduct ele-
ment of the emotional distress tort may be met "not so much 
from what is done as from abuse by the defendant of some rela-
tion or position which gives the defendant actual or apparent 
power to damage plaintiff's interests.''37 Thus, the outrageous 
conduct standard has been met in cases involving abuses of 
power by a school that bullied a young girl into confessing to acts 
plaintiff's desperate need for cash to obtain assent to a payment of only 3% of total 
amount acknowledged by the defendant justified rescission). 
34. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE 
L.J. 997, 1024 (1985) (arguing that duress and unconscionability involve an attempt, 
through the exercise of state power, "to prevent one contracting party from exercising 
illegitimate power over the other"). 
35. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9-11, at 354 (noting that nearly all 
twentieth-century undue influence cases have involved a confidential relationship). 
36. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 
(1966). 
37. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 61. 
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she had not committed;38 by a landlord who embarrassed and 
humiliated a tenant by a wrongful, racially discriminatory evic-
tion;39 by an association that threatened violence against a busi-
ness owner and damage to his truck;40 and in a number of cases 
involving collection agencies using threats of arrest or telephone 
calls around the clock, and involving neighbors, employers, and 
relatives in the collection effort.41 In all of these cases, the de-
fendant's abuse of power and the plaintiff's consequent loss of 
power and/or status met the tort requirement.42 
c. Power in Antidiscrimination Law 
Discrimination doctrine long has been premised on a certain 
view of power.43 Under this view, courts assume that white per-
sons traditionally have held power (from knowledge, wealth, 
and/or birth) and that the state should exercise its power to 
equalize power by conferring "equal treatment" on nonwhite 
persons.44 The most recent doctrine in this area appears to re-
flect a perception that antidiscrimination law has vested too 
much power in persons who are members of traditionally disen-
franchised groups at the expense of those who traditionally pos-
sess the power in this society.45 
38. Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814 (Minn. 1926). 
39. Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mich. 1983). 
40. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,240 P.2d 282 (1952). 
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 61-62. 
42. For an analysis of the power vectors of the landlord-tenant relationship and an 
argument that the power imbalance in that relationship warrants application of the 
foregoing line of emotional distress principles, see Susan Keller, Does the Roof Have to 
Cave In?: The Landlord/Tenant Power Relationship and the Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 1663 (1988). 
43. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind," 44 
STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991) (criticizing the notion that color-blind constitutionalism is a 
meaningful decision-making standard). 
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (suggesting that 
inferior education may fail to empower a child by preventing her from (1) succeeding in 
life, (2) adjusting to her environment, and (3) preparing for a profession); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (finding that Title VII's purpose is "to 
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have oper-
ated ... to favor ... white employees .... "). See also CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, 
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 216-34 (1989) (arguing that the fOCUS Of 
sex discrimination doctrine-that equality means treating likes alike and unlikes un-
like-reinforces and recapitulates male power because it fails to recognize that male 
power already has constructed an unequal reality for women in their dealings with 
men). 
45. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosan Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989). 
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Until twenty-five years ago, without risk of liability, a man 
could use his status to induce sexual favors from women co-
workers or, through the use of sexually explicit references or 
jokes, could create a workplace atmosphere that inhibited wo-
men's ability to work.46 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,47 
however, the Supreme Court held that such behavior is a form of 
sex discrimination even where the male demands no quid pro 
quo.48 Sexual harassment law, particularly hostile workplace 
cases following Meritor Savings, reflect an explicit recognition 
that men in this society exercise power over women by making 
sexual advances, by requesting sexual favors, and by engaging in 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.49 Such con-
duct may cause a woman to feel so disempowered that her work-
place becomes intolerable. 
2. The Subtle Power Ramifications of Specific Legal Doctrine 
Even when power is not an express doctrinal consideration, 
legal disputes and doctrinal debates often concern the distribu-
tion of power. 
For example, in the recent Supreme Court decision in Miller 
v. Johnson,50 the Court held that the state of Georgia's drawing 
of political districts to help assure minority group political repre-
sentation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.51 As the Court acknowledged, the issue in Miller 
implicated minority group members' political power; specifically, 
the issue implicated the political power of African-Americans 
See also Joel W. Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action 
Under Title VII: The Access Principle, 65 TEx. L. REv. 41, 59-69 (1986); U.S. COMM'N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF STOTTS 56-58 (1985) (indicating 
that the commission now applies the "color-blindness" principle, including "color-
blind" affirmative action). But see Gotanda, supra note 43, at 2-3. 
46. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (noting that the 
EEOC first added regulations addressing sexual harassment in 1980). See also Jill L. 
Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Traveled and the 
Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REv. 445, 445-63 (1981). 
47. 477 u.s. 57 (1986). 
48. /d. at 65. See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
49. Goodman, supra note 46, at 456-57 (noting that sexual harassment is degrad-
ing to women and that victims of sexual harassment experience depression and other 
physical and emotional symptoms and can lose their ability to work effectively). 
50. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). 
51. /d. at 2490-91. 
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living in Georgia.52 The Court, however, held that redistricting 
must be based on "race-neutral considerations."53 The result, 
therefore, reflects a conclusion that the potential for maximizing 
political empowerment of African-Americans in Georgia is not 
sufficiently compelling to justify Georgia's redistricting plan.54 
Modem labor law can be seen as an attempt to balance the 
employer's desire for absolute power over the work force and 
the employees' desire to curtail such power through unionization 
and doctrinal protection against employer abuses (e.g., race, sex, 
and age discrimination).55 Decisions for employers or employ-
ees tend to expand or contract the parties' relative power in an 
inverse relationship.56 
Recent recognition of "battered women's syndrome" as a 
defense for criminal behavior57 also marks recognition of inter-
personal power as an important legal construct in two ways. 
First, the "battered women's syndrome" theory explains, in 
power and disempowerment terms, why a battered woman may 
stay with a battering spouse despite the abuse; she stays because 
the physical abuse has degraded her self-esteem and her sense of 
self-empowerment.58 Second, the idea that a homicide may be 
justified,59 or a murder sentence reduced,60 because the battered 
woman feared her mate so much that she felt the only way to 
52. /d. at 2492-93 (criticizing the Department of Justice for its "maximization pol-
icy," a policy by which the Department of Justice refused to approve redistricting plans 
that failed to maximize minority-controlled voting districts). 
53. /d. at 2488. 
54. See id. at 2491. 
55. William R. Corbett, Taking the Employer's Gun and Bargaining About Re-
turning It: A Reply to a "Law, Economics and Negotiations Approach" to Striker Re-
placement Law, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1511, 1520-22 (1995). 
56. For examples of this zero-sum game in play, see NLRB v. Washington Alumi-
num Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (upholding employee's right to protest working conditions); 
George A. Hormel & Co. v. NLRB, 962 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (suggesting that 
employer had the right to terminate employee who supported consumer boycott of em-
ployer's product). 
57. Joan H. Krause, Of Merciful Justice and Justified Mercy: Commuting the 
Sentences of Battered Women Who Kill, 46 FLA. L. REv. 699, 709-13 (1994). 
58. !d. at 708. 
59. See generally Kansas v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); People v. 
Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 921 P.2d 1 (1996). 
60. See generally United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1992) (approving 
consideration of Battered Women's Syndrome as a valid ground for a discretionary 
downward departure from future sentencing guidelines). 
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survive was to kill reflects a recognition that lack of empower-
ment may create a compelling need for self-help. 
Critics of the legal system and of legal doctrine often argue 
that power is ignored or insufficiently analyzed. Thus, doctrinal 
critics of landlord-tenant law61 and divorce and child custody 
law,62 for example, criticize the legal system's failure to incorpo-
rate power considerations into legal doctrine. 
3. Law and the Legal System as Instruments of and 
Discourses About Power 
Our system of government (and perhaps all current systems 
of government) and our legal system are premised on possession, 
exercise, and retention of · power. Laws are enacted by 
lawmakers, exercising power conferred on them by law. These 
lawmakers are influenced by, among others, those who derive 
power because they possess the skill of persuasion (i.e., lobby-
ists), those who possess wealth and/or status that the lawmakers 
value (ie., lobbies), and those who possess knowledge and infor-
mation that the lawmakers need or desire. The legal system 
helps produce control through the use of state force-imprison-
ment or court-ordered action or inaction (i.e., injunctions). In 
this sense, law is "an instrument of power."63 
But law also is a "discourse of power. "64 Legal discourse-
the stories told in cases, statutes, and regulations-is one of the 
many means by which power is maintained and reinforced. Al-
lan Hutchinson summarizes this idea as follows: 
[L]aw is a special form of worldmaking .... [L]egal stories 
gain meaning from selective emphasis of certain features of 
our always complex and frequently ambiguous experi-
ence .... The legal raconteurs [lawyers, judges in opinions, 
legislators] claim an authority and objectivity for their tales 
that effectively overwhelms and trivializes other stories about 
the social world.65 
In short, law exercises power through discourse, thereby empow-
61. Keller, supra note 42. 
62. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 
YALE L.J. 1545, 1561 (1991). 
63. Foucault, supra note 9, at 89. 
64. Jerry D. Leonard, Foucault: Genealogy, Law, Praxis, 14 LEGAL Sruo. F. 3, 10 
(1990). 
65. Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 861 (footnotes omitted). 
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ering some people at the expense of others.66 
Moreover, although rules of law "are empty in themselves," 
the manipulation of rules of law helps maintain the social or-
der.67 As Leonard explains, 
The effect of this discursive machination [i.e. the manipula-
tion of rules of law] is that, just as oppositional forces effec-
tively expose legal illegitimacies to the dangerous extent that 
the dominant legal consciousness must acknowledge crisis 
and the concomitant necessity of reform(ation) ... , the dom-
inant regime's seemingly innocent interpretation of a new set 
of rules or "rights" effectively works to recoup the losses of 
the crisis-moments in order to reinscribe but another form of 
hegemony.68 
Thus, great societal conflicts-such as the Civil Rights Move-
ment, the Labor Movement, and even small ruptures in legal 
thought through the exposure of indeterminacy in the law-are 
subjugated through a murky process of encapsulation. On a 
case-by-case basis, through an imperfect, zigzag, give-and-take 
process, the indeterminacy is controlled. There is, of course, no 
monolithic conspiracy to preserve control, but the effect is as if a 
secret controlling cabal were in place. Courts establish new law 
or reinterpret old law to respond to a problem. This process of 
addressing a problem and thereby calming tension has the effect 
of entrenching the legal system as it stands. Power is preserved. 
4. Empowerment as a Standard by Which the Legal System 
Can Be Measured 
Finally, empowerment is a standard by which the legal sys-
tem can be critiqued. The structure and form of the legal system 
can be seen as an exercise in power dynamics. Critics of court-
room adjudication and of alternative dispute resolution regularly 
consider power and empowerment as critical issues in evaluating 
how we resolve disputes. They argue that courtroom adjudica-
tion, through its forms and rituals, disempowers its users.69 Simi-
larly, others argue that alternative dispute resolution, lacking 
66. /d. For a discussion of how court opinions engage in world-making in connec-
tion with contract law, see Dalton, supra note 34. 
67. Leonard, supra note 64, at 14. 
68. ld. 
69. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: 
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 
375 (1982-83). 
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both formal oversight procedures and the behavior modulation 
inherent in more formal human interactions, facilitates bias 
against disempowered members of society.70 Taken together, 
these commentators suggest that a legal dispute resolution sys-
tem should empower its users and that a legal system fails when 
its users are left with a sense of disillusionment and 
disempowerment. 71 
B. Power as a Means of Maintaining Social Control 
From the standpoint of society as a whole, power is impor-
tant because it is a means of maintaining social control. Power 
can be seen as "war by other means ... , and [r]elations of subju-
gation, or more extreme and intense relations of domination 
[are] ... none other than the realization ... of a perpetual rela-
tionship of force. "72 In other words, the pervasive intrusion of 
power into every human interaction maintains social control. 
"The role of ... power is ... to reinscribe it[ self] in social institu-
tions, in economic inequalities, in language .... "73 Power, there-
fore, exists not only as an end in itself, recapitulating itself 
throughout all experience and interaction, but also as the means 
of its own preservation. 
C. The Interpersonal Meaning and Effects of Power 
On an individual level, power is an end in itself, a force for 
self-control and for loss of control, and the means of its own self-
maintenance. The motivation for power and the harm that the 
exploitation of power causes to both the powerholder and the 
power target are matters of concern. 
Human beings seek power out of a complex and indetermi-
nate combination of predisposition and socialization, which 
Western social psychologists see as a "psychological need. "74 
70. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk 
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1388-89 (arguing 
that the lack of formality in ADR fosters prejudice because the social ideals of fairness 
and equality do not check the parties' natural biases); Grillo, supra note 62. 
71. See generally Judith Resnick, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 845-59 (1984). 
72. Leonard, supra note 64, at 7, quoting Foucault, supra note 9, at 78, 89, 92. 
73. Foucault, supra note 9, at 90. 
74. Cobb, supra note 8, at 231-32. See also William L. Cook, Interdependence and 
the Interpersonal Sense of Control: An Analysis of Family Relationships, 64 J. PERSON-
ALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 587, 587 (1993) ("human beings are inherently motivated to 
achieve control in their environmental relations."). 
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People also seek power to obtain or fulfill needs and desires or 
to protect themselves against what they fear. Social psycholo-
gists refer to the idea that power is a tool for personal gain as the 
"instrumental utility of power."75 Consequently, power is signif-
icant because individuals, groups, and organizations want to 
have it and use it. 
Power is also significant because it is abused so easily. So-
cial psychologists believe that the possession of superior power 
creates a likelihood of abuse of that power. In line with the well-
known syllogism, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely,"76 they contend that powerholders cannot 
resist exploiting their superior power for personal gain. 77 
The social psychology literature also indicates that the pos-
session and use of power potentially can harm both the 
powerholder and the power target. Having exploited a weaker 
target, the superior powerholder tends to devalue the target, 
who is perceived as inferior and weak, mostly because the target 
complied with the powerholder's desire.78 Thereafter, "the tar-
get ... is not given full credit for anything he or she does."79 
David Kipnis calls this process of devaluation "the metamorphic 
effects of power."80 In fact, a failure to exercise power, if recog-
nized by the powerholder and the target as such, may have a 
metamorphic effect similar to the metamorphic effect caused by 
the exercise of power. If an exercise of power increases the 
powerholder's power and decreases the target's power, a recog-
nized failure to exercise power should have the opposite effect, 
75. Cobb, supra note 8, at 232. 
76. Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), in EssAYS ON 
FREEDOM AND POWER 329, 335 (1972). 
77. See Bertram Raven, The Bases of Power: Origins and Recent Developments, 
49 J. Soc. IssUEs No.4, 227, 241-42 (1993). The idea that humans cannot resist exploit-
ing their superior power raises the question of whether there is a distinction between 
the use of power and the abuse or exploitation of power. On one hand, I believe that 
any use of power to benefit the powerholder is an abuse if the powerholder obtains her 
will at the expense of the target's will. However, on the other hand, my experience as a 
parent of small children has convinced me (or I have come to rationalize) that power 
can be used benevolently. If I gave my daughter a "time out" for hitting her baby sister 
or running out into the street, I would not feel that the use of my power was an abuse of 
power. I also concede the possibility of beneficent uses of power outside the parenting 
context. 
78. !d. 
79. Kipnis, supra note 5, at 200-01. 
80. /d. at 200. 
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decreasing the powerholder's power and increasing the target's 
power. 
The target of a power assertion, in tum, is likely to develop 
a sense of learned helplessness.81 "Learned helplessness occurs 
when organisms learn that their responses are independent of 
desired outcomes and consequently manifest behavioral defi-
cits."82 In other words, if a person discovers she is subject to 
forces outside her control (such as the will of someone more 
powerful), she devalues herself,83 thereby losing self-esteem.84 
This sense of helplessness tends to result in depression.85 
There also is evidence that a victim of power exploitation is 
more likely to exploit power over others of even less power. The 
notion of dominance hierarchies, made famous by the analogy 
suggested in Schjelderup-Ebbe's visceral "pecking order" analy-
sis of relationships among chickens,86 suggests that power ex-
ploitation begets more exploitation. Thus, a victim of a power 
exploitation may be more likely to exploit persons who possess 
even less power. 
III. A MoDEL oF INTERPERSONAL PowER 
A. Sources for the Model 
Explained and described below is a detailed model of inter-
personal power. The model relies on several different sources 
from the social psychological, the philosophical, and the legal 
fields. In this sense, the model is a synthesis and reorganization 
of the works of others. The idea that power derives from a 
number of bases, rather than from a unitary source, stems first 
from the works of Bertram Raven. Raven's lifetime of work re-
81. Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Refor· 
mation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PsYCHOL. 49, 50 (1978). 
82. Frank D. Fincham & Kathleen M. Cain, Learned Helplessness in Humans: A 
Developmental Analysis, 6 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 301, 301 (1986). 
83. /d. at 304. 
84. Abramson et al., supra note 81, at 50. This idea is really just the ftip-side of 
Kipnis' description of the effect on the powerholder; the powerholder and the target 
both devalue the target after the power exercise. 
85. Cook, supra note 74, at 587. 
86. Thorleif Schjelderup-Ebbe, Beitrllge zur Sozialpsychologie des Haushuhns, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR PSYCHOLOGIE 88, 225-52 (1922). Schjelderup-Ebbe notes that, in a 
chicken coop, if the strongest chicken in the coop pecks another chicken, the other 
chicken will respond by pecking an even weaker chicken. 
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garding interpersonal power87 began with the suggestion that 
power has six bases: (1) information, (2) reference, (3) exper-
tise, (4) legitimacy, (5) reward, and (6) coercion.88 These six ba-
ses are discussed and form a part of the model described below. 
In fact, virtually all subsequent interpersonal power theorists 
and researchers have cited Raven's work and defined their ideas 
about power in reference to Raven's model, seeking to test his 
model,89 criticize it,90 or simply supplement it.91 
The model described below is the product of a hybrid posi-
tion on Raven's model. On the one hand, my model falls in the 
supplementation category because it adopts many of the bases of 
power that Raven first suggested; yet, my model also expands 
the scope of Raven's categories and suggests additional catego-
ries of power. I am also a critic of Raven in the following re-
spects: (1) I use the term "social custom power" instead of 
Raven's "legitimate power" term because the notion of legiti-
macy is socially constructed; (2) because Raven's model inade-
quately addresses the power that derives from being white, male, 
heterosexual, able-bodied, Christian, etc., I treat such power as a 
separate power category ("enfranchisement power"); (3) I use 
the term "vectors of power" rather than Raven's "bases of 
power" term for reasons explained below; and ( 4) I find that 
Raven's omission of discourse power as a vector of power is a 
crucial omission because discourse is one of the most pervasive 
ways in which power is possessed and exercised. 
87. John R.P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power in STUDIES 
IN SociAL PowER 150 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959); Raven & Kruglanski, supra note 
16; Bertram H. Raven, A Power/Interaction Model of Interpersonal Influence: French 
and Raven Thirty Years Later, 7 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERsONALITY 217 (1992). 
88. French & Raven, supra note 87, at 232-36. 
89. See, e.g., John P. Garrison & Larry E. Bate, Toward Development and Mea-
surement of the Interpersonal Power Construct, 97 J. PsvcHOL. 95 (1977); Virginia P. 
Richmond et al., Power Strategies in Organizations: Communication Techniques and 
Messages, 11 HuM. CoMM. REs. 85 (1984). 
90. See, e.g., Kipnis, supra note 5, at 182-84 (describing the Raven model as 
"armchair speculations" and arguing that self-report of influence techniques is a supe-
rior methodology for determining bases of power). Kipnis' criticisms of Raven in this 
regard seem superficial; he criticizes Raven because people do not self-report the use of 
all Raven power bases. Id. at 183-84. However, as I have shown above, power is exer-
cised automatically and often stealthily; the volitional model of power exercise applies 
to only a very limited number of power categories. 
91. See, e.g., John H. Wade, Forms of Power in Family Mediation and Negotiation, 
1994 AusTL. J. FAM. L. 40 (adopting in large part the Raven model (although not by 
name) but suggesting additional bases of power). 
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1. The "Vector" Idea 
I use the term "vector," as opposed to words more com-
monly used in the fields of law ("factor" or "element") or social 
psychology ("basis" or "influence tactics"). My preference for 
the term "vector" stems from its definitional strengths and from 
defects in the connotations of other words I might have chosen. 
The word "vector" is defined as: "[A] quantity that has 
magnitude and direction and that is commonly represented by a 
directed line segment whose length represents the magnitude 
and whose orientation in space represents the direction."92 The 
vector idea, therefore, simultaneously connotes a concept that 
has relative weight (magnitude) and bearing (direction). I be-
lieve that the categories of power require a concept that can 
have both magnitude and direction; I do not believe that power 
interactions involve unilateral imposition of power by one party 
on another or that all types of power are of equal weight in an 
absolute or relative sense. 
Rather, all parties to an interaction may and often do pos-
sess any number of sources of power. Each source of power has 
weight relative to all other sources of power in a power interac-
tion, and power can move in favor of or against a party.93 Unlike 
"vector," legal terms such as "factor" and "element" lack the 
quality of direction. Such terms may constrict the use of my pro-
posed model to only doctrinal use. I suggest that the model can 
facilitate our assessment of the legal system and its forms. The 
common social science terminology, "bases of power" and "in-
fluence tactics," is no more availing; both terms fail to communi-
cate the weight and direction ideas. 
2. The Vectors of Power 
I perceive eleven vectors of power: (a) force, (b) en-
franchisement, (c) social customs, (d) compact, (e) information, 
(f) expertise, (g) reference, (h) perceived trustworthiness, (i) 
personal qualities, G) manipulation, and (k) discourse. 
92. WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DicnONARY 1296 (G & C Merriam Co. ed., 2d 
ed. 1977). 
93. For a practical application of these points in the contexts of unconscionability 
doctrine and arbitration process, see infra notes 175-395 and accompanying text. 
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a. Force Power 
The most elemental form of power is force. Force power 
derives from the threat or use of pain, restraint, or encapsulation 
so that compliance with the powerholder's intentions occurs 
without the target's volition. 94 All power interactions between 
an individual and her government involve an implied use of force 
power. The government, through deployment of the military 
throughout the world, impliedly threatens the use of force power 
to maintain domestic and international stability. Criminal law 
(through police, judges, and attorneys) also serves as a system of 
force power, incarcerating people who do not comply with the 
government's rules of behavior. Civil law also involves force 
power, both threatened and actual. Courts enforce injunctions 
and orders of specific performance, and, through the use of con-
tempt power, sanction disobedience by fine or imprisonment. In 
one-on-one interactions, force (pain or encapsulation) can be 
used to secure the powerholder's objectives. For example, a 
physically abusive husband asserts and maintains power over his 
target, his wife, by using force power.95 
b. Enfranchisement Power 
Although a state may be established through force power, 
power is sustained through a sometimes subtle, sometimes vio-
lent enfranchisement of power in persons, institutions, and 
groups.96 Enfranchisement, therefore, occurs on many different 
and complex fronts and is a crucial vector of power.97 
In fact, those who possess enfranchisement power may use 
all of the power vectors described below to reinforce their 
power. Thus, the social customs that confer power can be seen 
as the social customs of those with enfranchisement power. The 
resources that enable someone to promise or threaten (compact 
94. See Raven, supra note 77, at 236. 
95. See Hughes, supra note 2, at 575 (using the tenn "physical power" as a substi-
tute for force). 
96. See Leonard, supra note 64, at 7. See also Winter, supra note 17, at 829-32 
(noting that power can be imposed through such disparate acts as committing violence 
and giving affection). 
97. See generally LYNDA M. SAGESTRANO, 16 PsYCHOL. OF WoMEN Q. 439 (1992) 
(arguing that women use weaker power strategies, even when stronger strategies are 
available to them, because their status as women automatically places them in a posi-
tion of less power). 
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power) are held mostly by those with enfranchisement power. 
Likewise, those powerholders have influenced the construction 
of our notion of what constitutes information and expertise. 
Reference power, perceived trustworthiness power, personal qual-
ities power, and manipulation power are also socially con-
structed. Our socialization creates our perception of what we 
deem trustworthy, of the personal qualities that confer power, 
and of what works as a manipulation.98 Most importantly, en-
franchisement power is manifested, established, and reinforced 
through the exercise of discourse power.99 
In general, in the United States, being white, male, hetero-
sexual, upper class,10° Christian, able-bodied, English-speaking 
(particularly native English-speaking), and of European descent 
confers power.101 Those who possess all of the foregoing charac-
teristics can be characterized as totally enfranchised; such per-
sons possess the greatest power. A person who does not possess 
all of the foregoing qualities risks discrimination, a particularly 
conspicuous assertion of power by a powerholder against a tar-
get. Thus, nonwhite, female, homosexual, lower-class, non-
Christian, disabled, non-English speaking, and non-European 
persons all have been subjected and continue to be subjected to 
discrimination. 
Of course, most Americans possess some, but not all, en-
franchisement characteristics. Possession of some, but not all, of 
the attributes of enfranchisement confers some power or, more 
precisely, causes disempowerment to the extent the person lacks 
an enfranchisement characteristic. In other words, as Kimberle 
Crenshaw argues, those who fall within an intersection of multi-
ple categories of disenfranchisement tend to possess even less 
98. Because enfranchisement power works on a fairly subtle level in shaping the 
other vectors of power, their separate consideration is warranted. We may not perceive 
the operation of enfranchisement power when a businessman sets the agenda for a meet-
ing, but we can recognize that activity as an exercise of status social custom power, 
information power, and/or discourse power. 
99. See infra notes 162-168 and accompanying text. 
100. By the term "class," I do not mean class as that term is used in Western 
European countries. Rather, I mean the idea of class both from control over the means 
of production and from education, income, and occupation. Duncan Kennedy suggests 
that both ideas of class are economic, a conclusion with which I mostly agree. See 
Duncan Kennedy, Radical Intellectuals in American Politics, or My Talk at the Gramsci 
Institute, in SEXY DRESSING, ETc. 1, 12 (1993). 
101. See James T. Tedeschi et al., The Exercise of Power and Influence, in THE 
SociAL INFLUENCE PROCESSES, supra note 4, at 287, 302. 
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power.102 Thus, white women and African-American men, who 
otherwise possess all of the other enfranchisement characteris-
tics, tend to have more power than similar African-American 
women.103 
c. Social Custom Power 
Social custom confers power through the target's own value 
system;104 a powerholder holds social custom power over a target 
to the extent that society as a whole and the target in particular 
perceive the powerholder's social customs as meritorious.105 So-
cial custom power operates through a set of symbols, myths, doc-
uments, slogans, and legends for its asserted legitimacy.106 
For example, the President of the United States has power 
because of symbols (the flag, the Presidential Seal), a myth (the 
President represents all of the people), a "document" (the Con-
stitution), a slogan (the United States President is "the leader of 
the free world"), and many legends (Washington crossed the 
Delaware, Lincoln freed the slaves, and Franklin D. Roosevelt 
made the world safe for democracy). Similarly, a wealthy person 
has power because of myths (wealth is accumulated based on 
merit, and anyone with a good idea can get rich), documents 
(deeds, stock certificates, etc. that confer control of land and 
business enterprises), slogans ("free enterprise," "freedom of 
contract," etc.), and legends (the Horatio Alger legend). Such 
symbols, myths, documents, slogans, and legends become so in-
ternalized that they become part of each member of society, pro-
ducing "an inclination to conformity."107 
Of course, these operations of social custom power also are 
effective because of the implicit threat of force behind them. 
The State threatens to and does apply force to support these 
myths, documents, etc. This implied threat can be seen in the 
United States' use of military force in international arenas, the 
use of police force under our criminal law system, and the use of 
102. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 148-49. 
103. /d. 
104. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 37-38. 
105. BARNES, supra note 6, at 24. 
106. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 38. 
107. BARNES, supra note 6, at 24-26. 
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force to enforce private agreements (specific performance) and 
private rights (injunctions). 
Social custom power can be categorized into three sub-vec-
tors: (i) status power, (ii) personal associations power, and (iii) 
power from social norms, traditions, and values,108 each of which 
is described and explained below. 
(i) Status Social Custom Power 
There is overwhelming consensus that status confers 
power.109 Status power has been loosely defined as "the degree 
of deference which others believe a person should receive by vir-
tue of his role position."110 This perceived legitimacy based on 
office or socially prescribed role led Raven to term this form of 
power "legitimate power."111 Because the issue is one of per-
ceived rather than actual legitimacy, the term "status power" 
more appropriately describes this power vector. 
A wide variety of statuses can confer status power. First, as 
explained above, power exists through enfranchisement.112 A 
second and related form of status power-age-confers power 
within narrow parameters. A person in her thirties, forties, or 
fifties has greater power than an otherwise identical person in 
her twenties; in our society, however, a person in her seventies 
or eighties has less power than most other adults.U3 
Third, formal authority confers status power. A position, of-
fice, or title confers power almost automatically.114 Thus, elected 
108. Of course, social norms, values, and traditions explain all of the social custom 
vectors; they are separated here to illustrate that social norms, values, and traditions 
confer power even when they do not confer status. 
109. Jack M. Weatherford, Language in Political Anthropology, in PowER 
THROUGH DiscouRsE 11, 15 (Leah Kedar ed. 1987); Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, 
at 7. 
110. Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302. 
111. Raven, supra note 77, at 233. 
112. Enfranchisement is treated as a separate power vector because of its perva-
siveness and importance. 
113. But see ERDMAN PALMORE, THE HoNORABLE ELDERS: A CRoss-CuL-
TURAL ANALYSIS OF AGING IN JAPAN 127 (1975) (noting that Japanese elders retain 
much more status than do their Western counterparts). 
114. See Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302; NIKOLAS RosE, GoVERNING THE 
SouL: THE SHAPING OF THE PRIVATE SELF ix (1990); Weatherford, supra note 109, at 
15; Wade, supra note 91, at 46. 
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officials, CEOs, parents, and school principals possess power.115 
In fact, any supervisory position confers power, as does 
seniority.116 
Fourth, control over resources valued by society (money, 
materials, labor, or other goods or services), which has been 
called "wealth"117 or resource power,118 also confers status 
power.119 In fact, Tedeschi et al. argue that all status power stems 
from control over rewarding and punishing through resource al-
location.120 I believe that status power also derives from, among 
other things, social norms and values; nevertheless, resource 
power clearly is a particularly formidable source of status power. 
Ross Perot's power and the power of families such as the Forbes, 
the Rockefellers, and the Kennedys can be attributed, at least in 
part, to their control of resources. 
Prestige is also a form of status power, although it is closely 
linked to formal authority and resource power. Prestige can be 
seen as perceived power. Although prestige may be loosely con-
nected to the powerholder's actual quantity of disposable influ-
ence resources,121 it depends mostly on the target's perceptions 
(and the perceptions of society as a whole, which mediate the 
target's perceptions) for its weight. 
(ii) Personal Associations Social Custom Power 
Power from personal associations is a derivative form of so-
cial custom power; the powerholder's power originates in an-
other person who already possesses power. Personal association 
power can derive from lineage, which derives from one's familial 
background.122 Families with generations of. political power-
such as the Kennedys, the Gores, the Roosevelts, and the Rock-
efellers-exemplify this form of power; however, such power is 
not limited to famous people in society. This form of power is 
evident in the policies of social clubs and fraternities that give 
115. See Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302; RosE, supra note 114, at ix; Wea-
therford, supra note 109, at 15; Wade, supra note 91, at 46. 
116. See Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302. 
117. See S. Jack Odell, The Powers of Language: A Philosophical Analysis, in 
POWER THROUGH DISCOURSE, supra note 109, at 19, 20. 
118. See Thdeschi et al., supra note 101, at 302. 
119. /d. 
120. /d. 
121. /d. at 306. 
122. See id. at 303; O'Dell, supra note 117, at 20. 
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preferential consideration to the offspring of former members, in 
workplace environments, and in some schools' and colleges' ad-
missions policies. 
Other personal associations also confer power, as long as 
the association is with a person or people who possess power.123 
The addition to our speech of the phrase "Friends of Bill" (or 
"F.O.B.") and the cache that attaches to those who fall into this 
group evidences the prevalence and wide acceptance of this form 
of power.124 
(iii) Social Norms, Traditions, and Values Social Custom Power 
Social custom power also derives from oughtness, 125 social 
values and norms, and traditions. Oughtness engenders compli-
ance by activating personal and/or social commitments; it comes 
from the target's inclinations to help others or to conform to 
normative values regarding human interactions.126 Oughtness 
takes three forms. First, reciprocity-the idea that relationships 
should be fair and equal-confers power.127 Thus, a friend can 
compel her friend to return a favor. Second, equity-the idea 
that life should be fair-confers power.l28 Efforts to remedy 
past discrimination or to atone for past wrongdoing are exam-
ples of this form of power. Third, responsibility or depen-
dence-the human inclination to help those in need-confers 
some power.129 Beggars, addicts, and victims of abuse possess 
this power. 
Although oughtness may confer some power, the power 
conferred is weak and obscure. Unlike other forms of power, 
the use of oughtness does not necessarily confer greater power 
on the powerholder and, in fact, may diminish the power of the 
oughtness powerholder.130 This odd effect occurs because com-
123. Wade, supra note 91, at 45. 
124. Of course, such power waxes and wanes as the original powerholder's power 
waxes and wanes. Thus, we would expect that the power of F.O.B.s fluctuated in rough 
accord with the fluctuations in President Clinton's re-election prospects. 
125. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12. 
126. /d. See also Raven, supra note 77, at 234-35. 
127. Raven, supra note 77, at 234-35. 
128. /d. 
129. !d. 
130. As I argue above, an exercise of power usually enhances the power of the 
powerholder because it causes both the powerholder and the target to devalue the tar-
get. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. 
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pliance with oughtness can be perceived by both parties as the 
product of the target's benevolence, rather than as a product of 
the powerholder's exercise of power. The underlying message 
when a target complies with an oughtness power seems to be: "I 
will comply with your request this time; but, remember, my com-
pliance is not caused by you; it is caused by my kindness." At 
the very least, exercise of oughtness power may teach the 
powerholder that she is virtually powerless in all or most other 
respects. 131 
Indeed, the target's actions may be designed consciously or 
unconsciously to preserve the target's power in the long run by 
temporarily appeasing the powerholder and encouraging the 
powerholder to return to a state of quiescence.132 Peter Gabel 
calls this process "pseudo-recognition. "133 
Social norms and values also may confer power.134 Numer-
ous examples of this form of power exist. The social norms and 
values regarding women in the work force has resulted in women 
earning less money than men for performing equal work. De-
mocracy has proven to be a very effective power source for the 
state-so effective, in fact, that young men and women have died 
willingly in combat believing they were fighting to preserve de-
mocracy. Some social values may confer power on those who 
otherwise might lack it. For example, the social value that our 
society places on free expression has conferred some power on 
disenfranchised people expressing unpopular views.135 As Gabel 
and Harris point out, however, "the appeal to rights" also can 
reinforce powerlessness because it "inherently affirms that the 
source of social power resides in the State rather than in the peo-
ple themselves. "136 
Tradition power, also known as "habitual power," is the 
"power of the status quo that rests on the premise that it is nor-
mally easier to maintain a particular arrangement or course of 
131. The diminution in power caused by the exercise of oughtness power helps 
explain the disinclination of many people to accept favors, special help, or charity. 
132. See generally Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and 
the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1563, 1592-93 (1984). 
133. !d. at 1593. 
134. Wade, supra note 91, at 45. 
135. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting as speech the 
wearing of a jacket bearing the statement, "Fuck the Draft"). 
136. Gabel & Harris, supra note 69, at 375. 
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action than to change it. "137 It is easier to maintain the status 
quo because people tend to fear and, therefore, dislike change. 
Thus, in a divorce mediation, tradition power may influence wo-
men to undertake primary responsibility for child care.138 Tradi-
tion power also helps to explain the common law's durability and 
the legal concept of stare decisis. 
d. Compact Power 
Compact power involves an agreement of sorts between the 
powerholder and the target. The powerholder asserts power by 
promising to add or take away something of value to the tar-
get.139 The compact may be impersonal (such as a loss or gain in 
salary) or personal (such as approval or disapproval). This 
power vector is closely aligned with resource social custom power 
because the powerholder requires control over resources to ex-
ercise compact power. 
(i) Coercive Compact Power 
Also known as "sanction power, "140 coercive compact power 
derives from threatening to punish.141 Many employment-re-
lated power interactions involve exercises of coercive power, 
such as threats to demote, terminate, or cut pay. Similarly, par-
ents exercise coercive power by threatening to take a toy away 
from a child or to send a child to her room. A lover who threat-
ens to withhold sexual interactions also exercises coercive power. 
(ii) Reward Compact Power 
This is the opposite of coercive compact power. It involves 
promising a benefit to the target. 142 Promises of raises and pro-
motions to employees, of gifts and special treats to children, of 
love to a lover, and of parole to a prison inmate are all examples 
of reward compact power. 
137. Wade, supra note 91, at 45. 
138. See id. at 49. 
139. Raven, supra note 77, at 233. 
140. Wade, supra note 91, at 45. 
141. Raven, supra note 77, at 233. 
142. Jd. See also Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12. 
98 WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:67 
e. Information (Knowledge) Power 
Simply put, knowledge confers power.143 Specifically, ac-
cording to Raven, knowledge that has persuasive force confers 
power.144 Information power can be applied directly by expres-
sing the knowledge to the target, or indirectly by giving hints and 
making suggestions.145 In the contract bargaining context, infor-
mation is a key bargaining tool available to each party to a pro-
posed contract. Knowledge of future development plans of 
property being sold and knowledge of plans to discontinue build-
ing a particular car model both have the potential to greatly af-
fect value. The principle of caveat emptor, for example, 
expresses the courts' inclination to reward those who possess in-
formation power.146 Information also may confer power in the 
workplace (knowledge about favored company projects), educa-
tion (such as knowledge about scholarships and other financial 
aid), and in personal relationships (knowledge about a lover's 
infidelity). 
f. Expert Power 
Expert power arises from possessing great experience, 
knowledge, or status regarding _the subject at issue.147 Conse-
quently, expert power is closely linked to information power. Ex-
pert power can be distinguished from information power because 
whereas information power derives from communication, ex-
pressions, hints, or suggestions of specific information, expert 
power derives from the possibility that the powerholder pos-
sesses relevant information and from the fact that the other 
party knows of that possibility. Thus, deference to expert power 
derives from the expert's self-confidence, others' perception of 
her expertise, and the demand for her help.148 
Expert power can be acquired in a variety of ways ( educa-
143. Deborah Tanner, Remarks on Discourse and Power, in PowER THROUGH 
DrscouRsE, supra note 109, at 3-4; Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12. 
144. Raven, supra note 77, at 232. 
145. Id. at 235-36. 
146. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of 
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 15 (1978) (arguing that the law of nondisclosure should 
be structured to reward deliberate accumulation of information). 
147. Raven, supra note 77, at 233; Wade, supra note 91, at 45. 
148. Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 23; Tedeschi et al., supra note 101, at 
304. 
1997) . POWER ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RELATIONS 99 
tion, training, or experience) and can take a wide variety of 
forms (technical, historical, technological, informational, or edu-
cational). In fact, the more complicated society becomes, the 
greater the power of experts in their chosen field. Fields as di-
verse as medicine, law, psychology, psychiatry, and electronics 
have witnessed the slow erosion of the influence of the general 
practitioner. The power of the specialist is growing because it is 
slowly becoming impossible for one person to be an expert in all 
sub-fields of a particular field. 
g. Reference Power 
Reference power is acquired in two ways: (1) the target 
cedes power to the powerholder because the target desires the 
powerholder's acceptance, or (2) the target wants to be identi-
fied with the powerholder or has a sense of already-existing 
identification with the powerholder. 149 Tedeschi and Bonoma 
call reference power "social contagion" power150 because it de-
rives from the target's desire to model or to imitate the 
powerholder.151 Examples of reference power include older sib-
lings' power over younger siblings, and the power of mentors, 
actors, athletes, and popular musicians. 
h. Perceived Trustworthiness Power 
Power may come from the powerholder's perceived trust-
worthiness, particularly the target's perception of the 
powerholder's inclination to promote the target's self-interest 
rather than the powerholder's self-interest.152 Clergypersons, 
doctors, and psychologists derive power from being perceived as 
trustworthy, as do parents, friends, and relatives. Indeed, the 
early development of undue influence law involved a fairly ex-
plicit recognition that we defer to powerholders when we per-
ceive these powerholders as inclined to protect our interests, 
rather than their own.t53 
149. Raven, supra note 77, at 233. 
150. Tedeschi & Sonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12. 
151. /d. at 24-25. 
152. See id. at 23. 
153. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
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i. Personal Qualities Power 
On a culturally contingent basis, some character traits tend 
to confer power.154 In Western culture, attributes such as self-
confidence, determination, endurance, intelligence, persistence, 
memory, calmness, and charisma all tend to confer power be-
cause they communicate something to the target about the 
powerholder that causes the target to value or to defer to the 
powerholder. Self-confidence, calmness, and charisma commu-
nicate to the target that the powerholder believes that she should 
have power over the target. Determination and persistence 
communicate that the powerholder is vested in and believes she 
is right about the object of her determination and persistence. 
Memory and intelligence become sources of power, much like 
expert power, when the powerholder and target believe that the 
powerholder's memory is better than the target's memory/55 
and/or that the powerholder is simply smarter than the target 
(and therefore is right about whatever she wants). 
As noted previously, there is a connection between those 
who possess enfranchisement power and the construction of soci-
ety's notion of which personal qualities confer power. For exam-
ple, as Marl Matsuda explains, "accent" is a socially constructed 
norm.156 She points out that: 
Everyone has an accent, but when an employer refuses to 
hire a person "with an accent," they are referring to a hidden 
norm of non-accent-a linguistic impossibility, but a socially 
constructed reality. People in power are perceived as speak-
ing normal, unaccented English. Any speech that is different 
from that constructed norm is called an accent.157 
It seems equally likely that self-confidence, determination, en-
durance, intelligence, persistence, memory, calmness, and cha-
risma are equally and similarly socially constructed. 
j. Manipulation Power 
Manipulation power is exercised secretly and indirectly.158 
154. See Wade, supra note 91, at 45. 
155. See id. at 51 (arguing that memory for detail confers power in a divorce 
mediation). 
156. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L. REv. 1329, 1361 (1991). 
157. !d. 
158. See Tedeschi & Bonoma, supra note 4, at 9-12. 
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It derives from changing some aspect of the target, maneuvering 
the target's environment to inhibit or to facilitate the desired be-
havior,159 distracting the target,160 or causing the target discom-
fort that falls short of a direct sanction161 (which would be 
coercive compact power). Manipulation power therefore occurs 
in many different contexts and is difficult to discern. Examples 
include subtly nudging a spouse so she will awaken and hear a 
baby crying, designing a car so that it cannot start unless the seat 
belt is fastened, and pestering and harassing the target until she 
gives in to the powerholder's desires. 
k. Discourse Power 
Discourse power is one of· the most significant sources of 
power. Any exercise of power short of force is a language prod-
uct.162 In fact, Virginia Richmond and her colleagues argue that 
communication may be the most important factor in determining 
an individual's power.163 Information, expertise, compacts, so-
cial customs, trustworthiness, and manipulations are imposed as 
power vectors on the target or communicated to the target 
through the use of speech. Consequently, according to Jack 
Weatherford, the person who establishes the initial agenda and 
context of an interaction possesses tremendous power.164 Like-
wise, control over the procedures by which decisions are made 
confers power.165 Communication skills, such as organization 
and clarity, also confer some discourse power.166 In fact, "the 
very act of describing a source of power or perceived power is 
(itself) a source of power."167 
The importance of discourse power can be seen only by 
more closely examining how and in what contexts it operates. 
First, the media exercises tremendous discourse power. Those 
who possess power in society, particularly those who possess me-
159. Raven, supra note 77, at 236. 
160. /d. at 237. 
161. This form of power sometimes is called "nuisance power." Wade, supra note 
91, at 45. 
162. See Weatherford, supra note 109, at 11. 
163. Virginia P. Richmond et al., Power Strategies in Organizations Communica-
tion Techniques and Messages, 11 HuM. COMM. REs. 85, 89 (1984). 
164. Weatherford, supra note 109, at 15. 
165. Wade, supra note 91, at 45. 
166. See id. at 51. 
167. See id. at 45. 
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dia power, define and confine the spectrum of ideas that achieve 
society-wide dissemination. If movies and television treat mar-
riage between persons of the opposite sex as "normal," then 
marriage between persons of the same sex is marginalized and 
made "abnormal." If the model of leadership is almost always 
depicted as white and male, even when a nonwhite or woman is 
in charge, leadership by nonwhites and women that conflicts 
with the white-male model is marginalized. 
Patterns of discourse create and reinforce tremendous 
power in our society. For example, the discourse in our society 
portrays male as the norm and female as different; women are 
viewed in reference to men, rather than in reference to women's 
experiences in a male-dominated world.168 The discourse about 
sexuality defines and confines homosexuality in a similar way; 
the common discourse portrays heterosexuals as normal and 
marginalizes homosexuals as "outside" normal sexuality. In law, 
judges exercise discourse power through their opinions. The 
facts they include and omit, the words they use, and the structure 
of their discussions set boundaries on future discussions. 
On a more interpersonal level, an employer may exercise 
discourse power through a number of subtle yet effective tech-
niques. She can emphasize her discourse power by controlling 
the time, location, participants, seating, and agenda for a meet-
ing. Thus, even before the powerholder and the target have met, 
they have participated in a discourse about the powerholder's 
power over the target. 
B. Limitations on and Complexities in the Model of Power 
This model can facilitate our analysis of legal issues, our as-
sessment of doctrine, and our evaluation of our systems of jus-
tice. A few important limitations of this model, however, need 
to be considered.169 
1. Reductionist Nature of Modeling 
Any model of power is essentially reductionist. The very 
process of dividing a construct into vectors and of creating a 
model reduces and simplifies. This process forces reality to fit 
168. See CATiiERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 22-23, 65 (1987). 
169. The limitations described below would apply to any model of a social 
construct. 
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into the parameters and concepts of the model. Power operates 
in such complex and subtle ways that any model is inadequate 
when measured against real-world experience. 
2. Inability to Verify Model 
There is no way to verify the validity of the model. Raven's 
model of power, on which my model relies significantly, has been 
the subject of considerable analysis and testing in a wide variety 
of relationships (e.g., supervisors and supervisees, parents and 
children, husbands and wives, children and other children, teach-
ers and students, doctors and patients, salespersons and custom-
ers, franchisors and franchisees, couples in sexual encounters, 
and political figures and other political figures)P0 These studies 
conclude that the model works because some researcher can cat-
egorize successfully, after the fact, the power assertions of the 
parties involved in conformity with Raven's model.171 Statistical, 
after-the-fact assessments are, in this sense, more about the tes-
ter's perceptions than about the real-world interaction being 
studied. 172 
3. Indeterminacy of Power Classification Process 
In creating my power model, I assume, in some respects, 
that each power vector is independent and clearly demarcated. 
In fact, the lines between the power vectors can be blurred eas-
ily. For example, when a parent gives her child a "time out," it 
may be difficult to determine if she is exercising formal authority 
social custom power, compact power, resource social custom 
power, reference power, or a particular combination of the fore-
going. Similarly, when a judge jails an attorney for contempt, 
her power exercise is an indistinguishable hybrid of formal au-
thority social custom power and force power; but her most effec-
tive power source in future dealings may be a combination of her 
continuing resource social custom power, formal authority social 
custom power, reference power, discourse power, and her prestige 
social custom power. A judge's control over her docket is a par-
ticularly difficult classification conundrum. It can be a form of 
170. Raven, supra note 77, at 233-34. 
171. See, e.g., Bertram H. Raven, Political Applications of the Psychology of Inter-
personal Influence and Social Power, 11 PoL. PsYCHOL. 493 {1990). 
172. See Kipnis, supra note 5, at 182. 
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discourse power; however, it can also be part of the judge's for-
mal authority social custom power. Clearly, the line drawing in 
particular human interactions will be somewhat artificial.173 
4. Intersection and Interrelationship of the Vectors of Power 
Precisely demarcating the vectors of a power interaction in 
any context is difficult, if not impossible. The model suggests 
vectors of power, but it does not attempt to grapple with the 
many complex, intersecting, and complicated ways in which 
power operates in the real world.174 Therefore, the model is use-
ful as a tool for recognizing the sometimes obscure operations of 
power, but the model cannot be used to derive absolute power 
values in complex relationships. 
In any power interaction, both the powerholder and the tar-
get may possess any of the foregoing power vectors. For exam-
ple, a supervisor may possess formal authority social custom 
power over her supervisee, but a supervisee can exercise dis-
course power by calling a meeting with the supervisor and setting 
the agenda. If the supervisee is related to the CEO or possesses 
enfranchisement power that the supervisor lacks, the power rela-
tionship may be skewed and intersecting; in such a situation, it 
may be difficult to determine which party actually possesses 
greater power. 
Moreover, the power vectors and sub-vectors are not of uni-
form strength. For example, oughtness social custom power actu-
ally may cause the powerhdlder to lose power and is, therefore, a 
weaker form of power. On the other hand, the immediacy of 
compact power, where the target gets a reward or punishment, is 
a stronger form of power in many contexts. Manipulation power 
173. Although the line drawing is artificial, it is not meaningless. The point of 
developing this model is to enrich the analysis of power interactions and to aid recogni-
tion of the operation of power in situations where the operation of power may be diffi-
cult to discern. In other words, it really does not matter whether the judge is exercising 
discourse power or formal authority when she controls her docket; what matters is that 
she is exercising power and that we can recognize her actions as reflecting and manifest-
ing power. 
174. See generally Raven & Kruglanski, supra note 16, at 81 (noting that, in the 
real world, "a power relationship includes several bases of power" and that "even 
greater complexity" is introduced "when there are differing degrees of each power base 
operating in a given ... situation"); John P. Garrison & Larry E. Pate, Toward Develop-
ment and Measurement of the Interpersonal Power Construct, 97 J. PsYCHOL. 95, 99-103 
(1977) (finding empirical support for the idea that power is multidimensional). 
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and discourse power are more difficult to classify in terms of 
strength because they are not always recognized consciously. 
The magnitude of a powerholder's particular power vector 
is another complexity worth considering. We know a billionaire 
possesses more resource social custom power than a person with 
a net worth of $100,000; how much more power the billionaire 
possesses is less clear. Within any large, hierarchical employ-
ment structure, many people possess substantial formal authority 
social custom power and can exercise compact power over their 
subordinates. Therefore, it is insufficient to note that a person 
possesses a power vector; the magnitude of that power vector is 
equally important. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE PowER MoDEL To THE 
UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE AND TO THE 
ANALYSIS OF ARBITRATION AS A MEANS 
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
A. Unconscionability 
1. Background of the Doctrine 
The legal maxim, pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be 
observed), communicates the courts' overriding preference to 
avoid interfering with contractual bargains. Occasionally, how-
ever, some courts have determined that particular contractual 
bargains were so one-sided that this principle would work an in-
justice. For example, courts of equity have denied specific per-
formance on the grounds that "the exchange is grossly 
inadequate"175 and indirectly corrected the unfairness of the bar-
gain "by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of 
the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the 
clause was contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose 
of the contract."176 
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
chose to allow courts to confront directly the perceived bad bar-
gain problem. Section 2-302 (and its descendant, Restatement 
175. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 
(1979) ("specific perfonnance ... will be refused if such relief would be unfair be-
cause ... the exchange is grossly inadequate."). See, e.g., Gabrielson v. Hogan, 298 F. 
722, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1924) (affinning the denial of specific perfonnance based on lack 
of equivalency in a sale of land for one-third more than it was worth). 
176. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. 
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(Second) of Contracts, Section 208) allows courts to assess ex-
plicitly the fairness of the bargain as a matter of law.177 Section 
2-302 provides: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause 
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was 
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.178 
Neither Section 2-302 nor Section 208 clearly defines the 
term "unconscionable." In the seminal law review article for un-
conscionability doctrine, Unconscionability and the Code: The 
Emperor's New Clause, the late Professor Arthur Leff proposed 
that a contract should be deemed unconscionable only if the 
court finds both "procedural unconscionability" and "substan-
tive unconscionability" present in the transaction.179 
Substantive unconscionability means that the terms of the 
contract are unreasonably harsh.180 Substantive unconscionabil-
ity, although crucial to a determination of unconscionability, is 
pertinent to this Article only to the extent that the contract 
terms may have ramifications bearing on the power between the 
parties. Particularly unfair terms may evidence a power dispar-
ity not apparent from the court's description of the facts or from 
the parties' presentation of the evidence.181 Where the terms are 
written in legalese, they also may confer information power on 
the party more familiar with legal language.182 If the contract 
includes terms giving one party control over the other, power 
may be created or reinforced. Finally, some terms are a dis-
course about the parties' relative power183 by communicating a 
structure for the parties' relationship.184 Such terms serve a 
myth-making function; their presence in the parties' proposed 
177. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNTRACTS§ 208. 
178. u.c.c. § 2-302. 
179. Leff, supra note 26, at 539. 
180. Id. at 539-40. 
181. See, e.g., Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 382-83 n.8 {Alaska 1986) (argu-
ing that the presence of very unfair terms may either negate or at least reduce the 
requirement of procedural unconscionability). 
182. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965) (noting that the contract term at issue is virtually incomprehensible yet 
enforceable). 
183. See supra sub-part III{A){2){k). 
184. For a detailed discussion of this point in connection with the surrogate 
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agreement may limit the parties' conceptions of the power pos-
sibilities within their relationship. 
While the terms to a contract may bear on, evidence, create, 
or reinforce power, the focus of this Part of the Article is the 
procedural unconscionability requirement. Procedural uncon-
scionability, according to Professor Leff, means unfairness in the 
bargaining process.185 Early cases applying Professor Left's pro-
cedural unconscionability formulation refined the standard to in-
clude "an absence of meaningful choice"186 and/or a "gross 
inequality of bargaining power. "187 This refinement is both an 
explicit and an implicit call for an assessment of power. The call 
is explicit because a problem with the parties' relative bargaining 
power may satisfy the requirement. It is implicit because if one 
party has no "meaningful choice" and therefore must acquire 
what she needs or wants from the other party, she likely pos-
sesses very little bargaining power. 
2. Analytical Perspective 
In subpart (3) below, I describe the ideas that courts have 
used to grapple with the question of power. This analysis reveals 
that most courts analyze the parties' relative power incom-
pletely. I do not contend that all of the cases are wrongly de-
cided or that a gross inequality of bargaining power exists in 
every contract. Rather, I contend that the cases are reasoned 
poorly because they fail to or deficiently analyze a crucial is-
sue.188 The risk of poor reasoning is the possibility of poor-qual-
ity results. 
The courts' stories of the parties' relationships do not in-
clude all information relevant to an analysis of power. For ex-
ample, courts rarely mention race, sex, or class,189 thereby 
precluding a complete analysis of enfranchisement power. Also, 
parenting contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William and Elizabeth Stern, see 
infra notes 342-347 and accompanying text. 
185. Leff, supra note 26, at 539. 
186. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. The power implications of Williams, not addressed 
by the court because of the procedural posture of the case, are detailed below. 
187. /d. 
188. It is worth noting that this Article does not purport to address the question of 
how much disparity is enough to warrant the conclusion that there was procedural 
unconscionability. 
189. This omission is not necessarily bad. Identifying race, sex, or class as a source 
of power or disempowerment has the potential to reinforce race, sex, and class as 
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courts seldom describe the bargaining process with sufficient de-
tail to allow an assessment of the parties' contract formation dis-
courses. Consequently, little or no information exists with which 
to assess the discourse-based power vectors. This world making 
and world restricting is an exercise of the judges' discourse 
power. Thomas Ross notes that "[s]ociety generally accepts the 
notion of judges (or lawyers) crafting their version of the 'facts,' 
telling the story their way, yet pretending that the events speak 
for themselves. "190 A judicial opinion is, of course, an advocacy 
piece. The author of a judicial opinion uses her opinion to argue 
the wisdom and legitimacy of the particular result she has 
reached. Facts supporting her result are highlighted and de-
scribed in detail; facts that do not support her result, on the 
other hand, are shaded, obscured, minimized, or even omitted. 
Moreover, even some facts that support the result may be omit-
ted because the author of the opinion did not consider their rele-
vancy. As a result, the world depicted in judicial opinions lacks 
much of the subtlety and complexity of the real world.191 
The foregoing limitations on the judicial process support the 
argument that "small doctrinal adjustments ... will prove inef-
fective because they do not consider the systems of power and 
knowledge within which all interpretive acts take place. "192 
Although I concede this difficulty as a general proposition, I 
nevertheless retain a reconstructionist aspiration. I perceive the 
explicit call for the consideration of power embedded in uncon-
scionability doctrine as an opportunity to begin reconstructing a 
legal system cognizant of and responsive to power dynamics. 
In subpart (4) below, I suggest how this opportunity may be 
exploited. I demonstrate the possibilities for an in-depth analy-
sis of power through application of my power model. I use the 
model to analyze the power relationships in two well-known un-
conscionability cases: In re Baby Ml93 and Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co. 194 This analysis, although constrained by 
sources of power and to discourage totally enfranchised persons from contracting with 
persons who lack some characteristic of enfranchisement power. 
190. Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 381, 387 (1989). 
191. Thus, Ross concludes, "we have known for some time that opinions are, in 
part, stories." /d. 
192. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 10, at 823. 
193. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 537 
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
194. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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the world making of the courts that heard the two cases, reveals 
that at least bargaining power sometimes can be analyzed mean-
ingfully within the current doctrinal framework. The model al-
lows consideration and even confrontation of the systems of 
power. 
3. The Analysis of Power in Unconscionability Cases 
Because unconscionability doctrine requires courts to ex-
amine power, courts have been forced to develop and apply 
ideas about interpersonal power. Although most recent cases 
refer to the general idea of procedural unconscionability, courts' 
ideas about power vary greatly. Some courts touch on several of 
the ideas suggested above, although incompletely. Other courts 
completely ignore power. Still others simplify power so much 
that, as a practical matter, power is irrelevant. Even those courts 
that have concluded that unequal bargaining power infected the 
parties' bargain analyzed the power issues incompletely. I de-
scribe and analyze with reference to the power model the doctri-
nal approaches courts have used in unconscionability cases, 
using three categories: the Contract of Adhesion Approach, the 
Knowing Assent Approach, and the Multivariable Approach.195 
a. The Contract of Adhesion Approach 
The Contract of Adhesion Approach predates the doctrine 
of unconscionability.196 The advent of unconscionability, how-
ever, has not deterred some courts from continuing to rely on 
contract of adhesion ideas.197 
The Contract of Adhesion Approach does not require any 
explicit assessment of power. Rather, the focus is on whether 
the contract can be classified as a "contract of adhesion. "198 
Power, in such cases, is a side issue. Courts applying the Con-
tract of Adhesion Approach hold that a contract is unconsciona-
ble only if the party has no alternative to obtain a particular 
necessity other than to accept the standard form contract that 
195. Some courts have not considered power as an issue. See, e.g., Sherman v. 
Lunsford, 44 Wash. App. 858, 723 P.2d 1176 (1986) (no discussion of power even 
though the party claiming unconscionability had accepted the contract out of a desper-
ate need to prevent a huge economic loss). 
196. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
197. See, e.g., In re Estate of Szorek, 551 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
198. See, e.g., Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Wyo. 1988). 
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the other party offers.199 TYpical examples of such contractors 
include public utilities,200 common carriers,201 and hospitals.202 
In traditional political terms, this approach can be seen as more 
or less conservative. By restricting relief to only the most obvi-
ous and excessive problems (e.g., contracts for necessities be-
tween an individual and monopolies), courts reflect a fear of 
over-inclusion, a fear that freedom of contract otherwise would 
be impaired. 
The Contract of Adhesion Approach has been applied in a 
wide variety of circumstances. For example, courts have ruled 
against consumers when the subject matter of the contract was 
not deemed a necessity, so that protection by the law of uncon-
scionability was deemed unnecessary. Milligan v. Big Valley 
Corporation203 is typical. In Milligan, the plaintiff's decedent en-
tered into a contract with a ski resort to participate in a ski 
race.204 The contract contained a "release of claim" that pur-
ported to absolve the defendant of all potential liability for any 
injury to the decedent.205 After the decedent died in the race, 
the plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant ski resort's negli-
gence caused the death and the clause was unenforceable as 
against public policy.206 
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim and enforced the ex-
culpatory clause.207 It reasoned that the contract was not unen-
forceable as a contract of adhesion because (1) the decedent had 
a choice not to race, (2) racing is not a necessity, and (3) the 
decedent therefore had reasonable alternatives to participating 
in the race.208 The court noted that the contract was presented 
on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, but held this fact irrelevant.209 
This holding seems to ignore the very issue that the court 
199. See, e.g., In re Estate of Szorek, 551 N.E.2d at 700. 
200. Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 697 P.2d 128, 131 
(N.M. 1985). 
201. Milligan, 754 P.2d at 1066; Anderson v. Union Pacific R.R., 790 P.2d 438, 441 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990). 
202. McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E. 2d 1306, 1314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
203. 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988). 
204. /d. at 1064. 
205. /d. at 1064-65. 
206. /d. 
207. /d. at 1069. 
208. /d. at 1067-68. 
209. /d. at 1067. 
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purports to be analyzing: The ski resort's "take-it-or-leave-it" 
statement suggests that the decedent had no other choice but to 
assent to the defendant's proposed contract. To put this idea in 
terms of the model, this statement indicates that the defendant 
possessed significant compact power. The court also did not con-
sider that the decedent was an individual dealing with a corpora-
tion (which suggests a disparity in resource social custom power) 
or that the clause was phrased in legalese210 (which suggests a 
disparity in discourse power because the decedent was a ski in-
structor by trade211 ). Moreover, the contract released the de-
fendant from liability even for personal injury or property 
damage claims unrelated to the race. The contract provided that 
the decedent released the defendant from liability for all claims 
of any kind "sustained . . . during my stay at . . . [defendant's 
resort]."212 The unconscionability issue, therefore, appears to be 
somewhat more complicated than the court suggests.213 
Some courts take an opposite route in applying the Contract 
of Adhesion Approach. These courts hold that the contract is 
not unconscionable unless it was presented on a "take-it-or-leave 
it" basis and there was no opportunity to bargain.214 For exam-
ple, in Albuquerque Tire Company v. Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph,215 Albuquerque Tire had contracted with Moun-
tain States for a listing in Mountain States' yellow pages.216 The 
contract limited Mountain States' liability for breach or negli-
gence to return of the money paid for the advertisement.217 
When Mountain States negligently listed a U-Haul business' 
phone number under the listing for Albuquerque Tire, Albu-
210. See id. at 1064-65 (using tenns such as "in consideration of," "release and 
discharge," "any and all legal claims or legal liability of any kind, nature and descrip-
tion," "save and hold hannless"). 
211. /d. at 1065. 
212. /d. For a similar case and court analysis involving a minor, see Jones v. Dres-
sel, 623 P.2d 370, 374-75 (Colo. 1981) (finding no procedural unconscionability even 
given the additional fact that the injured party was a minor at the time the contract was 
made (age social custom power)). 
213. The result in Milligan may stem, in part, from the importance of the ski in-
dustry to the Wyoming economy. A finding of unconscionability or that the contract is 
one of adhesion would have potential ramifications for the entire industry. 
214. See Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 697 P.2d 128, 
131 (N.M. 1985) (quoting Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882, 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 172, 185, 377 P.2d 284, 297 {1962)). 
215. 697 P.2d 128 {N.M. 1985). 
216. /d. at 129 (1985). 
217. /d. at 129-30. 
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querque Tire sued for breach of contract.218 
The court concluded that the contract was not one of adhe-
sion because there was no express evidence, such as failed at-
tempts to bargain, that Albuquerque Tire could not have 
negotiated the terms of the contract.219 Mountain States, how-
ever, possessed a monopoly with respect to yellow pages,220 
which suggests it possessed both resource social custom power 
and prestige social custom power. Also, the contract was a stan-
dard form contract prepared by Mountain States (discourse 
power).221 Finally, Mountain States was a much larger company 
than Albuquerque Tire,222 which is additional evidence of Moun-
tain States' greater resource social custom power. Although the 
court's recitation of the facts is incomplete, these facts alone sug-
gest that Albuquerque Tire probably had little or no real oppor-
tunity to bargain. Consequently, the court's conclusion that 
Albuquerque Tire failed to prove inability to bargain is suspect. 
b. The Knowing Assent Approach 
The Knowing Assent Approach is closely aligned with the 
Contract of Adhesion Approach in the sense that both ap-
proaches are conservative in political orientation. Under the 
Knowing Assent Approach, bargaining power does not matter; 
all that matters is "reality of assent. "223 This idea can be attrib-
uted to the reference in comment 1 to UCC Section 2-302 that 
"[t]he principle is one of prevention of ... unfair surprise."224 
Courts applying this approach hold that there is no unconsciona-
bility if "the provisions were explained to the other party and 
came to his knowledge and there was in fact a real and voluntary 
meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting. "225 
218. ld. at 129. 
219. /d. See also In re Estate of Szorek, 551 N.E.2d 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (hold-
ing that a contract between a woman plaintiff and a bank that required her to pay the 
bank's attorney's fees in any action between her and the bank could not be a contract of 
adhesion because the plaintiff did not object to the terms and could have gone to an-
other bank). 
220. Albuquerque, 697 P.2d at 132. 
221. /d. at 131. 
222. See id. at 129, 132. 
223. See generally Dalton, supra note 34, at 1037 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS§ 208 cmt. d (1979)). 
224. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1995). 
225. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971). Interestingly, 
although the Weaver court stated that the crucial issue was the idea of informed con-
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Wyatt v. Dishong226 applies the Knowing Assent Approach. 
Wyatt involved a covenant not to compete in a contract between 
two physicians, one the employer and the other the employee.227 
When the employee left and established a practice nearby, the 
employer sued, seeking to enforce the covenant by injunction.228 
The employee defended on the basis that, among other things, 
the clause was unconscionable.229 The court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that there was no procedural unconscionability 
because both parties were health professionals and the employee 
knew about the clause when he signed the contract (the cove-
nant had been called to the employee's attention when the con-
tract was made). 230 
The case contains many facts that the court could have used 
to assess the parties' relative power, perhaps enough to conclude 
that the procedural unconscionability requirement was met by a 
showing of gross inequality of bargaining power. First, the par-
ties were in an employer-employee relationship,231 indicating 
that the employer likely possessed formal authority social custom 
power and resource social custom power over the employee. Sec-
ond, although the facts are somewhat murky on this point, it ap-
pears that the employer drafted the contract, including the 
clause at issue (discourse power).232 Third, the employee was 
much newer to the field and business of medicine,233 suggesting a 
likely disparity in the parties' information power and expert 
power. Fourth, over the course of the parties' contractual rela-
tionship, the employer substantially reduced the employee's sal-
sent, the court also devoted a substantial part of its opinion identifying inequalities in 
the parties' power. Id. at 145-46 (noting Weaver's lack of education, his employment in 
mostly laborer jobs, the fact that he signed the agreement without reading it because an 
American Oil employee told him to do so, and the fact that American Oil drafted the 
contract). 
226. 469 N.E.2d 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
227. Id. at 609. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 610. The employee also argued that the covenant not to compete was 
an unreasonable restraint of trade, arguing that the temporal and special limitations 
were overbroad. ld. The court treated the unreasonable restraint of trade argument 
and the unconscionability argument as separate grounds on which a covenant not to 
compete may be found unenforceable. ld. at 610-11. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 609. 
232. See id. at 609-10. 
233. Id. at 609. 
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ary twice, and the employee accepted these reductions. 234 These 
salary reduction interactions and the unusually large breadth of 
the clause (five years within a fifty-mile radius)235 indicate that 
the employer's formal authority social custom power and re-
source social custom power over the employee were particularly 
weighty. 
The court's analysis in Jones v. Johnson236 differs slightly 
from that of the Wyatt court. Jones reflects somewhat of a hy-
brid of the Contract of Adhesion Approach and the Knowing 
Assent Approach. Jones, a woman facing foreclosure of her 
home, entered into a contract with a man named Johnson.237 
Johnson acquired title to her home by promising to assume 
Jones' loan and by agreeing to pay her delinquent charges and 
attorney's fees.238 Jones agreed to continue to live in the house 
and to pay Johnson $179 per month in rent, the exact amount of 
the monthly mortgage payment.239 Jones defaulted; Johnson 
evicted her, and Jones sued, claiming the contract was uncon-
scionable.240 The court held that procedural unconscionability 
exists when there is an "absence of meaningful choice and where 
lack of education or sophistication results in no opportunity to 
understand the terms of the agreement. "241 The court concluded 
that the contract was not procedurally unconscionable, citing 
both Contract of Adhesion ideas and Knowing Assent ideas: 
Johnson explained the terms of the transaction to Jones. 
There is no claim she was coerced or browbeaten by Johnson 
to sign the documents. Jones had an opportunity to seek ad-
vice about the transaction but did not do so. All the evidence 
indicates that she freely and voluntarily signed the documents 
and had a free choice not to do so. Also, there were alterna-
tives available to her. She could have allowed the foreclosure 
to proceed .... Or, she could have attempted to sell the home 
234. /d. at 610. 
235. /d. at 609. The clause also involved an exercise of some discourse power. It 
declared that, if the restrictions were deemed excessive, they could be revised to include 
the "maximum reasonable restrictions" allowed under Illinois law. /d. at 610. This ad-
ditional provision reflects a dexterity with legal principles that the employee probably 
did not possess. 
236. 761 P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
237. /d. at 38. 
238. /d. 
239. /d. 
240. /d. 
241. Id. at 39. 
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herself .... 242 
Although the court concluded that the contract was not pro-
cedurally unconscionable, it noted several facts that might have 
enriched its analysis of this issue. First, Jones was a woman and 
Johnson was a man243 (giving Johnson greater enfranchisement 
power). Second, Jones was unemployed and experiencing finan-
cial difficulties, whereas Johnson could afford to pay the delin-
quencies on her notes, indicating that she lacked and he 
possessed resource social custom power.244 Third, Johnson some-
how "learned of the notice of default" on Jones' property and 
approached Jones with suggestions of methods of avoiding fore-
closure.245 These facts suggest that Johnson possessed several 
vectors of power, including information, expert, and discourse 
power. Manipulation power may have been involved as well, be-
cause Johnson clearly wanted Jones to select a particular method 
of avoiding foreclosure (the one by which he acquired title to her 
land). His suggestion of multiple methods may have been a ploy 
to gain her confidence. Finally, Jones apparently possessed only 
a high school education,246 which also may have increased John-
son's information power and expert power in his dealings with 
Jones. 
c. The Multivariable Approach 
The Multivariable Approach involves identifying and apply-
ing a number of potential indicia of interpersonal power. Thus, 
in Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 247 the court held that the follow-
ing factors were relevant in analyzing the relative bargaining 
power of the parties: age, education, intelligence, business acu-
men and experience, relative bargaining power (which the court 
did not define further), who drafted the contract, whether the 
terms of the contract were explained, whether the terms were 
negotiable, and whether there were alternate sources of supply 
for the goods in question.248 A number of courts have added an 
242. ld. at 40. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. ld. at 38. 
246. Id. at 40. 
247. 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
248. Id. at 268. See also In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys., 
720 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 
N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988). 
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additional consideration: whether the other party engaged in 
"deceptive or high pressured (sales) tactics."249 This approach 
can be seen as liberal in political orientation. The use of multi-
ple factors for analysis reflects more sympathy for the potential 
of unequal bargaining power to result in an unequal bargain. 
Although the breadth of this list of considerations suggests a de-
sire for an in-depth analysis of the power relationship, in many 
cases, the courts' analyses are quite limited. 
In re "Apollo" Air Passenger Computer Reservation System 
involved a liquidated damages clause in a contract between a 
travel agency and United Airlines.250 By the terms of the con-
tract, United supplied the agency with a computer system for 
handling airplane flight reservations in exchange for a specified 
fee.251 The agency's cancellation of the contract subjected the 
agency to a substantial penalty unrelated in amount to the dam-
ages United would suffer from such a cancellation.252 In analyz-
ing the procedural unconscionability issue, the court cited with 
approval the Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp. list of factors described 
above.253 The court held, however, that the contract was not 
procedurally unconscionable because one other similar system 
existed in the United States and "[n]othing in the record indi-
cates that the persons negotiating the contract for [the 
agency] ... were of an age, education or intelligence such that 
they could not understand the terms or the import of the con-
tract entered into. "254 Thus, the court in "Apollo" Air purported 
to apply a broad spectrum of power variables but, in fact, fo-
cused only on the parties' ability to understand the contract and 
the availability of alternatives-a hybrid of the Contract of Ad-
hesion and Knowing Assent approaches.255 Also, although the 
court states that the case is "sadly wanting in anything" to sup-
249. See Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 828. 
250. 720 F. Supp. at 1061. 
251. /d. at 1063. 
252. /d. at 1067. 
253. /d. at 1065. It is worth noting that "Apollo" Air was decided by a federal 
district court located in New York, whereas Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp. was decided by 
a district court sitting in Michigan and purportedly applying Michigan law. 
254. /d. at 1064. 
255. Some cases apply all of the power vectors they articulate. See, e.g., Johnson 
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268-69 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (considering plaintiff's 
age, education, literacy, the fact that Mobil approached him, and the fact that Mobil's 
representative did not have the authority to bargain). 
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port the plaintiff's procedural unconscionability argument,256 
some facts the court recited suggest that the resolution of the 
issue was less obvious. First, United was a large, multimillion 
dollar international company, whereas the agency was a small 
individually-owned operation (a huge resource social custom 
power disparity). Second, only two such computer reservation 
systems were available in the entire United States, United 
drafted the contract, and United offered it on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis.257 These facts suggest a great disparity in the parties' 
relative resource social custom power, information power, artd 
discourse power. While these facts do not compel the conclusion 
that the contract was procedurally unconscionable, they suggest 
that the issue was more complicated than the court stated.258 
The majority of cases applying the Multivariable Approach 
adopt some, but not all, of the Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp. con-
siderations. Typically, these courts identify three or four factors 
that evidence the parties' relative power, such as the manner in 
which the contract was entered into, the parties' education, their 
understanding of the contract's terms, and whether the key 
terms were in fine print.259 
Able Holding Company v. American District Telegraph 
arose out of a contract between an amusement park and a fire 
prevention system company for the installation of a fire preven-
tion system.Z60 The contract included a clause, which the amuse-
ment park contended was unconscionable, that limited the fire 
prevention company's liability for breach to the greater of ten 
percent of the annual charge or $250.261 The court defined pro-
cedural unconscionability in terms of bargaining power, holding 
that the factors to be considered were the manner in which the 
256. 720 F. Supp. at 1064. 
257. /d. 
258. Gillman involved a similar incongruity between a court's articulation of nu-
merous power considerations and its analysis of only a few. See Gillman v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) (finding no inequality of bargaining 
power with respect to a term in fine print on the back of a contract between a large 
international bank and an individual because the individual (1) had time to read the 
contract, (2) could have consulted an attorney, and (3) had business experience). 
259. Abel Holding Co. v. American Dist. Tel., 350 A.2d 292, 304 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1975), affd, 371 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). See also Ahern v. 
Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792 (IJJ. App. Ct. 1990); H. Jon Geis, P.C. v. Landau, 458 
N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983). 
260. 350 A.2d at 295. 
261. /d. at 296. 
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contract was entered into, the parties' education, their under-
standing of the contract's terms, and whether the key term was 
in fine print.262 
The court held that there was no procedural unconscionabil-
ity ,263 reasoning that there were fourteen competing alarm serv-
ices listed in the phone book, the fire protection service 
company did not prevent bargaining, and the amusement park 
had fire insurance to protect itself.264 The court also emphasized 
the importance of freedom of contract and of not allowing par-
ties out of contracts they did not read.265 
The following facts make the court's analysis of the power 
issue seem significantly oversimplified: (1) two people 
owned the amusement park, whereas the fire prevention system 
company was large, national, and, in prior litigation, had been 
determined to have engaged in monopolistic conduct in violation 
of antitrust law; (2) the fire prevention system company ap-
proached the amusement park immediately after the park had 
suffered damage from an earlier fire; (3) the parties did not dis-
cuss terms; and (4) the amusement park owners neither fully 
read the contract nor "shopped around" for alternative fire pre-
vention systems.266 Thus, the court ignored the fire prevention 
company's substantial information, expert, manipulation, and dis-
course power. Furthermore, the court did not consider the 
amusement park owner's likely diminished personal qualities 
power. In short, the fire prevention company possessed substan-
tially greater power than did the amusement park owners. 
Therefore, the court's conclusion that there was no procedural 
unconscionability is debatable. 
H. Jon Geis, P. C. v. Landau involved a claim for $3,500 aris-
ing out of a contract for psychological counseling services.267 
Although the Landau court listed only "the experience and edu-
cation of the party claiming the contract to be unconscionable 
••• "
268 as factors to consider, the court actually considered sev-
262. ld. at 304. 
263. See also Haspel v. Rollins Protective Serv., Inc., 490 So. 2d 530 (La. Ct. App. 
1986) (addressing whether a clause similar to that in Abel is unconscionable, and con-
cluding that it is not). 
264. 350 A.2d at 303, 305. 
265. ld. 
266. ld. at 302-03. 
267. 458 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983). 
268. ld. at 1003. 
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eral other power vectors and concluded that there was suffi-
ciently unequal bargaining power between the parties.269 The 
court considered Dr. Geis' doctorate degree, his many years of 
practice, his association with a psychological institute as a super-
visor, and Ms. Landau's poverty.270 These facts evidence Geis' 
superior information power, expert power, formal authority social 
custom power, personal association social custom power, personal 
qualities power, and resource social custom power. The court, 
however, emphasized that Landau was divorced during the 
course of the therapy; she felt "awful" and "strangled" by Geis, 
clinging to him "as the expert" with his encouragement while he 
repeatedly assured her not to worry about her growing debt to 
him.271 These facts raise issues of possible disparity in the par-
ties' relative personal qualities power, expert power, manipulation 
power, and reference power. Furthermore, the court did not 
mention the possible enfranchisement power implications of the 
fact that Geis was a man and Landau was a woman.272 Never-
theless, the court's opinion in Landau recognized and considered 
many facts bearing on the parties' relative power and, based on 
the information provided, reached an appropriate result. 
Associated Press v. Southern Arkansas Radio Company273 
involved an acceleration clause in a contract between a radio sta-
tion and a news service.274 The radio station argued that the 
clause, which was particularly harsh, was unconscionable.275 The 
court agreed, citing four reasons: (1) the radio station had not 
read the contract; (2) no other such services were available to 
the radio station; (3) the contract was a preprinted form; and 
269. /d. 
270. /d. 
271. /d. at 1003-05. 
272. See also Ahem v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787, 792-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (ignor-
ing the male-female power issues but considering not only the power implications of the 
noncomplaining party's greater knowledge and expertise but also the defendant's feel-
ings of intimidation and the plaintiff's use of high-pressure sales techniques in deciding 
contract was unconscionable). But see York v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 585 F. Supp. 
1265, 1277 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (finding no unconscionability even though the party claim-
ing unconscionability was suffering from a major depressive episode). Ahem and Lan-
dau can be contrasted with the over-simplified bargaining power analysis of the trial 
court in In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd 
in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), analyzed in depth below. See infra notes 301-346 and 
accompanying text. 
273. 809 S.W.2d 695 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991). 
274. /d. at 696. 
275. /d. at 697. 
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( 4) the radio station was already in default under the terms of 
the contract at the time the contract was signed.276 Other facts 
support the court's implicit conclusion that there was a power 
imbalance between the parties: (1) the news service was one of 
only two such services in the entire nation, whereas a married 
couple owned and operated the radio station277 (indicating a 
possible disparity in the parties' resource social custom power); 
(2) the husband never finished college278 (which may have cre-
ated imbalances in the parties' relative status social custom 
power, information power, expert power, reference power, and 
personal qualities power); and (3) the wife and husband repre-
sented themselves in the negotiations, whereas a large, well-
known law firm represented the news service.279 The involve-
ment of the law firm suggests a power disparity in the areas of 
resource social custom power (the news service could afford at-
torneys, whereas the couple could not) and discourse power (the 
attorneys probably had superior linguistic skills, contract draft-
ing skills, and negotiating skills). The attorneys also may have 
enjoyed some prestige social custom power to the extent that at-
torneys working for large law firms enjoy such power. 
Less obvious sources of power that probably were present 
but were not discussed in the court's opinion include the news 
service's more extensive experience and knowledge regarding 
such contracts (indicating information power and expert power) 
and the news service's likely perceived trustworthiness power be-
cause of the societal perception that news organizations perform 
a quasi-public service. 
4. The Power Model As a Tool for Analyzing Procedural 
Unconscionability 
I selected the facts of two very different, but well-known 
unconscionability cases-Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Company280 and In re Baby M281-to demonstrate, in greater 
276. ld. 
277. Id. at 695. 
278. Id. at 696. There are no facts indicating the wife's educational background, 
an omission that itself may be a discourse about male power and social validation of 
men and social invalidation of women. 
279. /d. 
280. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
281. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 537 
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
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depth, how the model can be used to enrich unconscionability 
power analysis. This Part does not purport to analyze or de-
scribe what the courts actually said about the parties' relative 
power; rather, this Part uses the facts of these cases as a spring-
board for application of the power model. Thus, this Part of the 
Article reads the cases as a text or story and attempts to analyze 
the power ramifications of the facts stated by the courts that 
heard these cases. 
a. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company282 
Williams, generally regarded as the seminal unconscionabil-
ity case, involved a series of household goods installment con-
tracts between a woman, Williams, and a furniture store, Walker-
Thomas.283 The contracts contained a "dragnet clause," a provi-
sion that entitled Walker-Thomas to hold a security interest in all 
goods Williams purchased during her multi-year relationship 
with Walker-Thomas until Williams paid off all of the items.284 
Shortly after purchasing a stereo from Walker-Thomas, Williams 
defaulted on her payments.285 Walker-Thomas then sought to 
replevy all of the items that Williams ever had purchased from 
Walker-Thomas.286 Williams sued to have the clause deemed un-
conscionable and lost in the trial court, which denied her uncon-
scionability claim without considering its substance.287 On 
appeal, the court of appeals remanded the case to the court be-
low to consider the possible application of the doctrine of uncon-
scionability.288 Accordingly, no published court analysis of the 
procedural unconscionability issues in the case exists. The fame 
of the case and the interesting story told in the opinions, how-
ever, make the case ripe for analysis in accordance with the 
power model suggested above. 
Application of the power model reveals that the power be-
tween the parties was substantially skewed towards Walker-
Thomas. First, Williams was separated from her husband, was 
282. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
283. /d. at 447. See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 
915 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (the lower court's opinion). 
284. See 350 F.2d at 447. 
285. /d. 
286. /d. 
287. /d. 
288. /d. at 450. 
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raising seven children on her own, had limited education, and 
was on public assistance.289 As a woman and a single parent, 
Williams possessed less enfranchisement power and resource so-
cial custom power than Walker-Thomas.290 Her lack of employ-
ment means she had less status social custom power. It also may 
suggest that the Walker-Thomas employees with whom she dealt 
had reference power as well, although the two opinions do not 
provide sufficient information to assess whether Williams de-
sired to be like the Walker-Thomas employees. 
Second, there appear to be many indications in the facts 
that Walker-Thomas possessed vastly superior information and 
expert power. The contracts appear to have been drafted by a 
person with significant business and legal experience, such as an 
attorney, using legal and business vernacular throughout, includ-
ing such terms as "hereafter," "pro rata," and "periodical install-
ment payment. "291 The use of this terminology also enhanced 
Walker-Thomas' discourse power. 
In contrast, Williams' poverty and lack of education suggest 
that she possessed little business or legal experience with which 
to analyze the transactions into which she was entering. Even 
her choice to enter into the transaction-a purchase of a $514 
stereo on a monthly welfare check of $218292-suggests some 
flaws in her economic judgment. Finally, although Williams pos-
sessed little information and expertise regarding Walker-
Thomas' business, Walker-Thomas knew exactly with whom it 
was dealing. The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the 
name of Williams' social worker and her $218-per-month stipend 
from the government.293 Consequently, Walker-Thomas must 
have known that Walker-Thomas represented the only means by 
which Williams could acquire household goods. At least, 
Walker-Thomas clearly knew its bargaining adversary better 
than she knew Walker-Thomas. This knowledge gave Walker-
Thomas additional information power. 
The contract between Walker-Thomas and Williams con-
289. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. Cir. 
1964). 
290. Of course, Williams' wealth, such as it was, was Williams' primary source of 
power over Walker-Thomas. She was a source of profit for Walker-Thomas. 
291. 350 F.2d at 447. 
292. 198 A.2d at 916. 
293. /d. 
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ferred significant power on Walker-Thomas. The contract de-
scribed the transaction as a "lease," rather than a sale.294 On its 
own, this term has three significant power vector ramifications. 
First, there is no evidence that Williams considered the transac-
tion as anything other than what it appeared to be, a sale; hence, 
Walker-Thomas was engaging in an exercise of some manipula-
tion power. Second, Walker-Thomas' understanding that the 
contract purported to be a lease, rather than a sale, gave Walker-
Thomas information power. Third, this attempt to exercise con-
trol over the nature of the transaction was an exercise of dis-
course power.295 
Walker-Thomas' greatest source of power appears to have 
been its discourse power. The contract's use of the term "lease" 
and of legal and business terminology conferred discourse power 
on Walker-Thomas. The clause at issue in Williams provided: 
[T]he amount of each periodical installment payment to be 
made by (purchaser) to the Company under this present lease 
shall be inclusive of and not in addition to the amount of each 
installment payment to be made by (purchaser) under such 
prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now and here-
after made by (purchaser) shall be credited pro rata on all out-
standing leases, bills and accounts due the Company by 
(purchaser) at the time each such payment is made.296 
In short, title to every purchase, new and old, remained in 
Walker-Thomas until Williams made full payment on all items. 
This clause had significant power ramifications. 
The clause, which even the Court of Appeals described as 
"rather obscure,"297 is a commentary on Walker-Thomas' supe-
rior information and discourse power. It conferred discourse 
power on Walker-Thomas because only Walker-Thomas under-
stood it. It also conferred discourse power by communicating 
that Walker-Thomas was in charge. Furthermore, the clause 
conferred discourse power by reinforcing and illustrating that 
Walker-Thomas understood the business world in ways Williams 
294. 350 F.2d at 447. 
295. It is not at all clear that Walker·Thomas' attempt to elevate form over sub-
stance in defining the transaction would have succeeded had the issue been litigated. 
See generally U.C.C. § 9-102 (1996) (indicating that the provisions of Article 9 apply to 
a contract creating a security interest in personal property "regardless of (the contract's] 
form"). 
296. 350 F.2d at 447 (emphasis added). 
297. ld. 
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did not. In fact, the evidence indicates that (1) Williams misun-
derstood her rights under the contracts, (2) sP.e did not read the 
actual contract documents, and (3) the contract documents were 
never explained to her.298 
Other sources of discourse power to Walker-Thomas were 
Walker-Thomas's drafting of the contract, the length of the con-
tracts,299 the length of the clause at issue, and the use of very fine 
print in the clause.300 Clearly, Walker-Thomas controlled the 
agenda and scope of the parties' discussions. 
These facts and others detailed below also demonstrate that 
Walker-Thomas exercised manipulation power. The unusual cir-
cumstance of Williams agreeing to pay so much for a stereo sug-
gests the exercise of such power. Walker-Thomas' use of 
excessively complicated terminology in the key paragraph, Wil-
liams' lack of understanding of the contract, and the lack of ex-
planation support this thesis. The possibility seems almost a 
. certainty in light of the fact that: (1) most of Williams' purchases 
were made at her home, (2) the contracts were signed "in 
blank," with the key terms filled in later by Walker-Thomas, 
(3) the paragraph at issue, providing for pro-rated payment of 
purchases she made, was in "extremely fine print," and (4) she 
was not provided with copies of any of the contracts.301 It ap-
pears that Walker-Thomas deliberately kept Williams in the dark 
about the contracts she was making to prevent her from making 
a reasoned decision. Clearly, had the trial court analyzed the 
procedural unconscionability issue, it would have concluded that 
there was a gross disparity in the parties' relative bargaining 
power. 
b. In Re Baby M 
In Re Baby M is the famous case arising out of a surrogate 
parenting contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William 
and Elizabeth Stem. 302 Whitehead agreed to be impregnated by 
William Stem through artificial insemination, and William Stem 
298. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. Cir. 
1964). 
299. The contract documents were six inches thick. /d. 
300. /d. 
301. /d. 
302. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 537 
A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
1997] POWER ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RELATIONS 125 
agreed to pay Whitehead $10,000.303 Accordingly, Whitehead 
was inseminated and carried Baby M to term.304 After Baby M 
was born, Whitehead realized she did not want to part with Baby 
M and the lawsuit ensued.305 The trial court held, in pertinent 
part, that the contract did not violate public policy and was not 
unconscionable.306 The trial court also terminated Whitehead's 
parental rights, finding that Baby M's best interests would be 
served by giving custody to the Sterns.307 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court held, however, that the contract was illegal and 
violated public policy.308 The court also held that the trial court 
improperly terminated Whitehead's parental rights309 and failed 
to consider adequately Whitehead's visitation rights.31° Finally, 
the court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that Baby M's best 
interests would be served by having her remain with the 
Sterns.311 The New Jersey Supreme Court did not address the 
unconscionability issue. 
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately did not 
resolve the case based on unconscionability, the issue remains an 
interesting one. The two opinions of In Re Baby M identify a 
large number of facts that could have been used to analyze the 
complex power relationship between the Sterns and Whitehead. 
Application of the power model reveals that the balance of 
power tilted significantly in favor of the Sterns. Even where 
Whitehead possessed power, the Sterns had substantial offsetting 
power. 
As a man, Mr. Stern possessed gender enfranchisement 
power. Furthermore, from the facts as a whole, the Sterns proba-
bly possessed greater social class enfranchisement power than did 
303. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-69 (N.J. 1988). Courts refer to such con-
tracts as "surrogate parenting contracts." See, e.g., In re Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1137. A 
surrogate parenting contract is defined as a contract between a man and a woman or a 
couple and a woman that calls for the woman, hereinafter the "gestator," to be "artifi-
cially inseminated or implanted with a fertilized egg, carry the child to term and, after 
delivery, relinquish all parental rights and give the child to its natural father who was, of 
course, the sperm donor." ld. 
304. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236. 
305. ld. at 1236-38. 
306. 525 A.2d at 1159-60. 
307. /d. at 1170. 
308. 537 A.2d at 1240-50. 
309. /d. at 1252. 
310. /d. at 1261-63. 
311. /d. at 1258. 
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Whitehead.312 The Stems also possessed much more social cus-
tom power than did Whitehead. The Sterns possessed more age 
social custom power; they were in their forties, whereas White-
head was in her twenties.313 In addition, the Stems also pos-
sessed formal authority, prestige, and norms and values social 
custom power, which Whitehead lacked. The Stems had doc-
toral degrees (Mrs. Stem also had a medical degree), whereas 
Whitehead never graduated from high schooP14 These facts 
suggest that the Stems not only had greater education status, but 
also had power from their titles ("doctor"), which conferred 
norms and values social custom power, prestige, and formal au-
thority. In contrast, Whitehead, who was not working outside 
her home, had only ever worked for a pizza-deli and her 
brother's delicatessen.315 Further, the related norm of deference 
to medical doctors conferred additional power on Mrs. Stem. 
It might be argued that a different social norm, in favor of 
women not working outside the home, conferred power on 
Whitehead. However, this social norm actually may be a source 
of disempowerment to Whitehead or, at least, not a particularly 
efficacious source of power. People who do not work outside 
the home and therefore depend on spouses for financial support 
tend to lack resource social custom power and prestige social cus-
tom power. Finally, Whitehead testified that she was motivated 
to become a surrogate by the Stems' responsibility oughtness so-
cial custom power (the idea that one should help those who need 
help). Whitehead testified that "she was motivated to join the 
(surrogacy) program in the hopes of 'giving the most loving gift 
of happiness to an unfortunate couple.' "316 
The parties' relative resource social custom power is much 
more complex. It appears each party possessed a resource the 
other wanted; Whitehead possessed the childbearing capacity 
that the Stems wanted, and the Stems possessed the wealth that 
Whitehead lacked. No doubt Whitehead's ability to carry the 
312. It is difficult, without additional infonnation, to reach a certain conclusion 
regarding the parties' relative social class. The parties' disparate incomes, educational 
achievements, career, and life histories (Whitehead married at sixteen, whereas the 
Sterns married while in graduate school, 525 A.2d at 1138, 1140) are significant evi-
dence of a social class difference. 
313. 525 A.2d 1128, 1138, 1140 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). 
314. /d. 
315. /d. at 1140-41. 
316. !d. at 1142. 
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Stems' future child conferred significant power on Whitehead. 
However, the Whiteheads had fairly grave financial problems. 
They declared bankruptcy a few years before the parties entered 
into negotiations, and, by the time the suit was filed, were in 
default on two mortgages.317 Also, Mr. Whitehead had held 
seven different jobs in the prior thirteen years and relied on un-
employment compensation at least once as his sole source of in-
come.318 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the 
idea that this contract involved an exploitation of the poor by 
the rich, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested the parties' 
disparate wealth played a part.319 The court also suggested that 
a woman's need for money may make her assent to a surrogacy 
contract less than voluntary.320 It seems likely that Whitehead's 
ability to maximize her resource social custom power probably 
was inhibited by her lack of other power sources, particularly her 
relative lack of information, expert, persona/qualities, and dis-
course power. On balance, the Sterns had greater useable re-
source social custom power.321 
The Sterns clearly possessed greater expert and information 
power. Whitehead possessed some pertinent knowledge and ex-
perience; she had carried two of her own children, had at-
tempted to become a surrogate on one prior occasion, and had 
consulted with an attorney regarding that prior attempt.322 The 
Stems, however, possessed even greater pertinent knowledge; 
therefore, Whitehead's knowledge was not a source of signifi-
cant and efficacious information power. As a medical doctor, 
Mrs. Stem had greater depth and breadth of technical knowl-
edge regarding pregnancy and childbirth than Whitehead. 
Evidence of Mrs. Stem's greater information and expert 
power can be found in the events following contract formation 
and successful impregnation of Whitehead.323 During the course 
317. /d. at 1140-41. 
318. /d. 
319. 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988). 
320. !d. at 1241. 
321. Another commentator might conclude that, given the Stems' strong desire 
for a child and need for a surrogate to carry that child, Whitehead possessed .at least as 
much resource social custom power as the Sterns possessed. 
322. 525 A.2d at 1140, 1142. 
323. Of course, postformation events are of only limited relevance to the parties' 
pre-formation power relationship. However, they do give clues of operations of power 
present at the time of contract formation. 
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of the Baby M pregnancy, Mrs. Stem "insisted that Mrs. White-
head undergo amniocentesis, take a prescription pharmaceuti-
cal . . . and take certain precautions when Mrs. Whitehead 
reported an elevation in blood pressure .... "324 The court's use 
of the word "insisted" and the fact that the parties' relationship 
"deteriorated" after these events325 suggests that the Stems' will 
overcame any disinclination on the part of Whitehead. There is 
also evidence that Whitehead did not understand the benefits 
she was to receive nor the risks she was assuming under the con-
tract,326 suggesting that Whitehead's information power was 
limited. 
Whitehead's consultation with an attorney did not confer 
much power on her. She consulted with an attorney only be-
cause the surrogacy program required it; and she did not consult 
with an attorney in connection with her contract with the 
Stems. 327 In any event, by the terms of the contract, the Stems 
were responsible for paying any attorney Whitehead con-
sulted.328 Consequently, Whitehead may have logically con-
cluded that any attorney she consulted would not necessarily act 
solely with her best interests in mind. Moreover, Whitehead's 
threat to take Baby M out of the country and the fact that she 
disappeared with Baby M for 87 days329 indicate Whitehead's 
lack of faith in the legal system.330 Finally, the Stems' greater 
wealth and business experience also resulted in their greater fi-
nancial and money management information power. 
The Sterns' personal qualities were also a source of power 
for the Stems over Whitehead. The Sterns' educational and ca-
reer achievements bespeak a significant amount of determina-
tion, ambition, and drive. The trial court also found that the 
Stems were mentally healthy and had close friendships and 
neighbors.331 In contrast, the trial court found that Whitehead 
324. 525 A.2d at 1143-44 (emphasis added). 
325. ld. 
326. /d. at 1142. 
327. ld. at 1142-43. 
328. ld. at 1160. 
329. ld. at 1145. 
330. On the other hand, at Whitehead's request, the attorney did negotiate some 
minor changes in the terms of Whitehead's first surrogacy contract. ld. at 1142. 
331. /d. at 1140, 1167. Personal qualities power is socially constructed. The sug-
gestion that the Sterns possessed greater personal qualities power merely reflects that 
the Sterns possessed more of those qualities that society tends to value. 
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was suffering from one or more emotional problems (one expert 
witness testified her problem was so severe that she suffered 
from an emotional disorder) and that her husband was an 
alcoholic. 332 
It is worth noting that the suggestion by the trial court and 
some of the expert witnesses that Whitehead had emotional 
problems may have been the product of significant social con-
struction. First, as the New Jersey Supreme Court indicates, 
Mrs. Stem's fears of pregnancy substantially exceeded the actual 
risk of harm; the risk that pregnancy would have caused her 
blindness or paraplegia was minimal, according to medical au-
thorities.333 Thus, her decision not to bear children could be 
seen as reflecting some neurosis on her part. Likewise, Mr. 
Stem's fervent desire "to continue his bloodline"334 could be 
viewed as self-obsessed. The fact that neither Stem was diag-
nosed with an emotional disorder may reflect the Stems' class 
affiliations with the psychologists and psychiatrists evaluating 
the parties. Moreover, as the supreme court states, "Mrs. White-
head was rather harshly judged ... by some of the experts. "335 
The New Jersey Supreme Court argues that her actions were not 
so irrational in light of her experience: she was told that she was 
a bad mother and had to part with a child to whom she had be-
come attached.336 Thus, some of the Stems' personal qualities 
power may have stemmed from the fact that their neuroses were 
of a type sanctioned by mental health professionals, whereas 
Whitehead's neuroses were not. 
The Stems may have used manipulation power in their deal-
ings with Whitehead. Although the contract describes Mrs. 
Stem as the "infertile wife," the Stems do not appear to have 
disclosed or explained the significance of Mrs. Stem's multiple 
sclerosis. The Sterns certainly did not disclose that the fears that 
led Mrs. Stem to forgo child-bearing were based on minimal 
medical risks. Thus, the Stems used their manipulation power to 
induce Whitehead to confer oughtness social custom power on 
them. 
Perhaps the Stems' most significant source of power was 
332. /d. at 1141, 1150, 1153. 
333. 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988). 
334. /d. 
335. /d. at 1259. 
336. /d. 
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their discourse power. Before Whitehead ever met the Stems, 
she was given a message that the prospective parents, and not 
she, were in control of the agenda. First, Whitehead learned of 
the surrogacy program from a newspaper advertisement,337 
which read, in part, "SURROGATE MOTHER WANTED. 
Couple unable to have child willing to pay $10,000 fee and ex-
penses to carry husband's child .... "338 This advertisement com-
municated two things: (1) others had set the fee at $10,000,339 
and (2) the child unquestionably would be the husband's. 
The structure of the parties' relationship as employer and 
employee was recapitulated in the process by which the parties 
were brought together. The Stems were given resumes ("bio-
graphical data") regarding potential "candidates" and attempted 
to schedule "interviews" with candidates.340 The use of a con-
tract, particularly a form contract,341 also suggests an employ-
ment relationship and therefore is a discourse about 
Whitehead's lack of power. Taken together, these structural 
matters evidence that the Stems, not Whitehead, controlled the 
agenda and setting for the parties' interactions. 
Likewise, the terms and language of the contract were 
sources of discourse power to the Stems. By the terms of the 
contract, in exchange for $10,000 plus payment of medical bills 
and other related expenses,342 Whitehead endured psychological 
testing and relinquished all rights to any child, to control the 
course of her pregnancy, to terminate the pregnancy because of 
birth defects, and to assess the wisdom of undergoing amni-
ocentesis.343 Whitehead also expressly assumed the risks of 
pregnancy and childbirth. 344 
In short, for a relatively small sum of money, Whitehead 
assumed all the risk and the Stems held all the control. The 
mandatory psychological testing and amniocenteses were 
designed to give the Stems information power over Whitehead, 
337. 525 A.2d 1128, 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). 
338. /d. (emphasis added). 
339. Whitehead never disputed the amount, even though amicus later character-
ized it as "so low as to be unconscionable." /d. at 1160. 
340. /d. at 1142. 
341. /d. 
342. These terms are an almost perfect recapitulation of standard employment 
contracts, salary plus medical insurance. 
343. 525 A.2d at 1142. 
344. /d. 
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and, more importantly, communicate that Whitehead was the 
only party about whom fitness was a relevant concern. Given 
that Whitehead was to supply half of the biological make-up of 
the child, had Whitehead possessed any power, the contract 
might have contained a clause subjecting the Stems to psycho-
logical testing before Whitehead would allow them to raise her 
child. By subjecting only Whitehead to testing, the contract 
communicated that the Stems were in control and conferred ad-
ditional power on them. 
Finally, the contract language communicated a power 
message slanted toward the Stems. In accordance with standard 
terminology, the contract referred to Whitehead as "Surrogate," 
rather than "Mother," "Biological Mother," or "Birth Mother"; 
and referred to Mr. Stem as "Natural Father," rather than 
"Sperm Donor."345 These language choices communicate a 
number of things about the parties' power. The choice of the 
word "Surrogate" not only ignored the prospective child's bio-
logical make-up entirely, but also objectified Whitehead by de-
flating the significance of her role to that of a "stand-in." The 
term "Surrogate" must be contrasted with Mr. Stern's title, 
"Natural Father," especially in light of the fact that Mrs. Stem 
was going to be primarily responsible for child care.346 Taken 
together, the message is unmistakable: Mr. Stem matters, but 
Whitehead is merely a tool brought in to solve a problem. This 
choice of language, therefore, was a source of power, a means by 
which power was imposed, and a recapitulation of the parties' 
power relationship.347 
c. Summary: Application of the Power Model to 
Unconscionability Analysis 
The question of whether procedural unconscionability in-
fected a particular contractual relationship is a complex one. 
Analysis of Williams and Baby M reveals that power operates in 
345. 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-70 (N.J. 1988). The contract referred to Mrs. Stern as 
the "Infertile Wife," 525 A.2d at 1162, which may be a discourse about Mrs. Stern 
somehow being blamed for her inability to safely bear children. This issue is beyond 
the scope of the Article. 
346. 525 A.2d at 1148. 
347. Terms of a contract may confer power by establishing the boundaries within 
which the parties are interacting. This possibility is especially likely here, where White-
head previously had seen and negotiated a virtually identical contract before she met 
the Sterns. 
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human relationships in multifarious and often unseen ways. 
Power can be inscribed in a word, an advertisement, a title, and 
wealth. It even may exist in the possession of acceptable 
neuroses. 
Courts have been slow to recognize and confront the actual 
operation of power in the world. Instead, courts continue to wed 
themselves to formulations of procedural unconscionability of 
only minimal substance. Courts that limit procedural unconscio-
nability to contracts for necessities between individuals and mo-
nopolies (Contract of Adhesion Approach) or to bargains not 
knowingly assented to (Knowing Assent Approach) miss the is-
sue altogether. Even courts applying the Multivariable Ap-
proach ignore the most important operations of power, those not 
obvious or observable. 
The parties themselves may recognize obvious operations of 
power, such as commercial strength (resource social custom 
power). The model described above, however, allows both par-
ties and courts to perceive the operation of other, less visible but 
equally important kinds of power. It is not always easy to recog-
nize the operation of power vectors such as enfranchisement 
power, social custom power, reference power, perceived trustwor-
thiness power, personal qualities power, manipulation power, and 
discourse power. Thus, the above model operates like a micro-
scope; it reveals information otherwise invisible. 
Using this tool, parties and courts have the information they 
need to reach better results. Parties can arm themselves with 
information power derived from recognizing power assertions of 
the persons with whom they deal. Courts can use the model to 
achieve better results. In short, the model can improve how 
courts and bargaining parties assess contractual power imbal-
ances that might produce unfair bargains. 
B. Arbitration as a Means of Dispute Resolution 
1. Introduction 
For several years, commentators, courts, and others have 
enthusiastically praised the idea of ADR in all of its forms.348 
Some, including myself, however, have questioned the value of 
348. See, e.g., Jane Byeff Kom, Changing Our Perspective on Arbitration: A Tradi-
tional and a Feminist View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 67; Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. 
Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 
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one or more forms of ADR.349 In an earlier Article, I catalog 
the criticisms that have been made regarding ADR in general 
and arbitration in particular, and add my own criticisms.350 
Edward Brunet argues that all forms of ADR, including ar-
bitration, erode the guidance function of laws. 351 Brunet also ar-
gues that ADR lacks the essential qualities and procedures 
necessary for "quality decision making. "352 
Brunet's thesis and anecdotal evidence is all we have to as-
sess the efficacy of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. 
Arbitration occurs in private.353 Only the parties attend, there is 
no court reporter, and the arbitrator's conclusions of law and 
fact are final and not reviewable on appeai.354 There is no way 
424 (1986); Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 
SMU L. REv. 2005 (1993). 
349. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Res-
olution, 62 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1987); Delgado et al., supra note 70, at 1388-89; Grillo, supra 
note 62; Richard Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAw., Feb. 14, 1994, at 53; 
Michael Hunter Schwartz, From Star to Supernova to Dark, Cold Neutron Star: The 
Early Life, the Explosion and the Collapse of Arbitration, 22 W. STATE U. L. REv. 1 
(1994). . 
350. Schwartz, supra note 349, at 13-24. I argue that arbitration's deficiencies in-
clude: (1) inadequate claim and defense disclosure, (2) insufficient exchange of evi-
dence, (3) lack of evidentiary limits on the presentation of the parties' cases, (4) lack of 
qualifications, control, or oversight of arbitrators, (5) loss of the right to a jury trial, 
(6) ability of arbitrators to create their own evidence, (7) loss of the efficiency benefits 
of consolidation and party joinder, (8) greater potential for bias, (9) loss of the value to 
society from the creation of precedent, (10) lack of legal standards, and (11) lack of 
review of arbitral results. /d. Ultimately, I conclude that some of these deficiencies 
cannot be remedied at all, and that those deficiencies that can be remedied can be fixed 
only by sacrificing the asserted benefits of arbitration. /d. at 35. 
351. See Brunet, supra note 349, at 23. 
352. /d. at 2-26, 33-35. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times describes the 
arbitration practices of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan. Michael A. Hiltzik & David R. 
Olmos, 'Kaiser Justice' System's Fairness is Questioned, L.A. TrMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at 
Al. The article describes what California lawyers call "Kaiser Justice." Kaiser, perhaps 
the largest user of arbitration services in California, opens an estimated 700 medical 
malpractice arbitration cases each year. /d. at A12. Kaiser and its attorneys keep close 
tabs on the decisions of arbitrators who have sat on their cases. Furthermore, some 
arbitrators have heard more than twenty cases involving Kaiser. /d. Critics argue that 
the volume of Kaiser's cases gives arbitrators a business incentive to decide cases in 
favor of Kaiser. /d. The possibility that such an incentive exists is supported by an 
Alameda County trial court judge's conclusion that the entire system by which Kaiser 
conducts its medical malpractice arbitrations is "'fraudulent, unconscionable and cor-
rupt ... in general."' /d. at A21. Interestingly, according to the Times, Kaiser arbitra-
tions actually take longer to complete than court trials. /d. at A12. Kaiser's practices 
support Brunet's assertion that ADR produces poor-quality decisions. 
353. Rau, supra note 348, at 2029. 
354. See Schwartz, supra note 349, at 22-23. 
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to test the quality of arbitrators' decisions. 
Consequently, the process of arbitration needs examination. 
Application of the above-described power model to the arbitra-
tion process reveals that the concerns about arbitration stem 
mostly from power and empowerment deficiencies of the arbi-
tration process. Arbitration greatly inflates the arbitrator's 
power, while greatly deflating the participants' power. 
In some cases, this distortion of power may be irrelevant; 
the only potential for harm stems from the parties' experience of 
the power imbalance. A person who experiences a power imbal-
ance may become depressed, develop a sense of learned help-
lessness, and abuse others less powerful than herself. 355 The lack 
of restraints on arbitrators also creates a substantial risk of unde-
sirable results, and increases the likelihood that arbitrators will 
act on prejudice.356 At a minimum, Delgado and his colleagues' 
observations about bias in ADR lend credence to Brunet's fear 
that arbitrators may make poor decisions and Richard Rueben's 
concern that arbitrators make decisions based on their own eco-
nomic self-interest and desire to obtain return business.357 
2. Past Scholarly Analysis of Power in Arbitration 
There has been little or no explicit attempt to analyze power 
as it bears on arbitration. A few commentators, however, have 
raised concerns that have power ramifications. 
Owen Fiss' oft-cited Against Settlement discusses the issue of 
power explicitly.358 Fiss argues that those who possess less 
power due primarily to a lack of economic resources select "set-
tlement," including arbitration, because they possess less 
power.359 Delgado and his colleagues also confront some power 
issues as they bear on all forms of ADR, including arbitration.360 
They argue that the lack of restraints on ADR decision makers 
stems from the informality and intimacy of ADR, and the lack of 
overt references in ADR processes to social values such as fair-
355. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. 
356. Delgado et al., supra note 70, at 1388-89. The lack of restraints allows the 
"human propensity to prejudge and make irrational categorizations" to flourish. Id. 
357. See, Reuben, supra note 349, at 54. 
358. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
359. ld. at 1073-78. 
360. Delgado et al., supra note 70. 
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ness and equality.361 This concern recognizes the deficiencies in 
the social norms and values social custom power restraints on 
ADR decision makers. 
Although Fiss and Delgado et al. have considered some 
general power ramifications of ADR, the specific power ramifi-
cations of the arbitration process have not been addressed. The 
power model described in Part III of this Article offers some 
different and unique insights into arbitration as a means of dis-
pute resolution. 
3. The Power Model Applied to Arbitration as a Means of 
Dispute Resolution 
This subpart addresses two questions: (1) What can the 
power model tell us about arbitration as a means of dispute reso-
lution? and (2) To what extent, if any, does the arbitration pro-
cess empower its users? The answer to both questions appears 
to be that arbitration, perhaps uniquely among all forms of dis-
pute resolution, tends to confer virtually unchecked power on 
the arbitrator while disempowering the parties. Moreover, most 
of the commentators' criticisms of arbitration described above 
derive from the power, empowerment, and disempowerment 
ramifications of the arbitration process. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that there are power and 
empowerment issues regarding arbitration that are unrelated to 
the power and empowerment of the arbitrator and the parties. 362 
The process and progress of the recent arbitration explosion has 
systemic power implications. The vast increase in the criticism of 
court adjudication can be seen as the dynamite that has caused 
the arbitration explosion. The court system has responded to the 
threat to its dominance by defining and confining the solution-
arbitration (or, more generally, ADR).363 This process com-
municates a message: genuine reform of the legal system is not 
needed; arbitration (ADR) will solve our problems. In fact, at-
361. Id. at 1387-89. In contrast, in adjudication, social values of fairness and 
equality are evoked by the flag, the courtroom setting, and the judge in her robe. 
362. As the Kaiser experience demonstrates, arbitration clauses often are imposed 
on less powerful persons by more powerful others such as Kaiser. See Hiltzik & Olmos, 
supra note 352, at A12 (stating that Kaiser "mandates" arbitration). 
363. Schwartz, supra note 349, at 22, 35. 
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tomeys and judges increasingly serve as arbitrators.364 Thus, the 
increased use of arbitration to resolve disputes can be seen as 
the means by which attorneys and judges have preserved their 
power by controlling the societal response to the threat posed by 
criticism of court adjudication. 
4. Vectors of Power in the Arbitration Process 
Social custom power plays a large role in the arbitration pro-
cess. The arbitrator derives social custom power from various 
sources. First, the arbitrator's title and status as decision maker 
confer prestige social custom power and formal authority social 
custom power. 
Surprisingly, arbitrators' formal authority social custom 
power may exceed that of judges. The power of judges in court 
adjudication is limited by several forces: (1) precedent, (2) ap-
pellate review, (3) written opinions, (4) competency review, and 
(5) selection and re-election processes. Some of these limits 
transfer power to the parties, who can challenge the judge's deci-
sions by appeal and challenge a judge's competency by com-
plaining to the appropriate state agency. These sources of 
formal authority social custom power and resource social custom 
power are not particularly efficacious; however, they do confer 
some power to the parties. 
The foregoing limits on judges' power either do not apply to 
an arbitrator or apply only on a very limited basis. First, arbitra-
tors are not required to follow precedent; in fact, both commen-
tators and courts express a sentiment that arbitrators should not 
follow precedent but, rather, should follow their own sense of 
natural justice.365 The arbitrator's sense of natural justice is 
either no standard at all for decision making or is an extremely 
limited standard. The standard confers virtually unlimited dis-
cretion (and therefore power) on the arbitrator. 
Second, appellate review of arbitration is extremely limited. 
364. See generally Louis J. Weber, Court-Referred ADR and the Lawyer-Mediator: 
In Service of Whom?, 46 SMU L. REv. 2113, 2115-16 (1993). 
365. See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 11, 832 P.2d 899, 904 (1992); 
Korn, supra note 348, at 102. See also Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Bldg. Serv. & 
Hosp. & Inst. Employees Union Local No. 113,64 N.W.2d 16,30 (Minn. 1954); Flood v. 
Caron, 441 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1982); Hoboken Mfrs.' R.R. Co. v. Hoboken R.R. 
Warehouse & Steamship Connecting Co., 27 A.2d 150, 155 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1942), affd, 31 A.2d 801 (N.J. 1943). 
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In most jurisdictions, an appellate court may overturn an arbitra-
tion decision only on a showing of fraud, corruption, or undue 
means.366 Appellate courts do not review the arbitrator's con-
clusions of fact or law, her interpretation of contract, or her ap-
plication of law to fact, no matter how egregious an error may 
be.367 This source of power for the arbitrator is a source of dis-
empowerment for the parties. The arbitrator is not fettered by 
the threat of review (more formal authority social custom power 
for the arbitrator), and the parties know they cannot challenge 
the arbitrator's decision (less formal authority social custom 
power to the parties).368 
The foregoing sources of formal authority social custom 
power disempower the parties in an unexpected way. In court 
adjudication, the presence of legal standards and the threat of 
appellate review combine to give some predictability to the re-
sult. Case results, of course, depend on factors such as the indef-
initeness of precedent and social policy and the problems of 
proof, including witness credibility and reliable documentation. 
However, precedent does influence the parties in their settle-
ment decision making. In arbitration, the parties lack this source 
of information power. 
Third, unlike a judge, an arbitrator need not explain the rea-
sons for her decision. 369 In fact, the American Arbitration Asso-
366. See, e.g., Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 21-22,832 P.2d at 911. See also Ahtna, Inc. 
v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 894 P.2d 657, 661 (Alaska 1995); Fischer v. Guaranteed 
Concrete Co., 151 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Minn. 1967); Graber v. Comstock Bank, 905 P.2d 
1112, 1115 (Nev. 1995); Bailey & Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1987); Boyd v. Davis, 127 Wash. 2d 256, 897 P.2d 1239, 1244 (1995) (Utter, J., concur-
ring); Riverton Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Pacific Power & Light, 391 P.2d 489, 500 (Wyo. 
1964). . 
367. See, e.g., Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 21-22, 832 P.2d at 911; Columbine Valley 
Constr. Co. v. Board of Directors, Roaring Fork Sch. Dist. RE-lJ, 626 P.2d 686, 695 
(Colo. 1981); 0 & G/O'Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partnership No.3, 
523 A.2d 1271, 1281 (Conn. 1987); Graber, 905 P.2d at 1116. See also Stephen Hayford 
& Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for 
Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 343, 366-67 (1995). 
368. The finality of arbitral awards distinguishes arbitration from mediation as a 
form of dispute resolution. Although mediation awards cannot be subjected to appel-
late review, a mediator's recommendations are subject to approval by each of the par-
ties. Thus, unlike the parties to an arbitration, the parties to a mediation retain some 
power over their fate, the power to say "no." 
369. See, e.g., Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal. 2d 515, 522, 212 P.2d 233, 239 (1949); 
Riverton, 391 P.2d at 500. See generally Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should Mandatory 
Written Opinions Be Required in All Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal 
Implications to the Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 151, 164-66 (1995). 
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ciation (AAA) tells its arbitrators that they should not explain 
their decisions in order to insulate their decisions from review. 370 
This factor creates another freedom from restriction for the arbi-
trator, which increases her formal authority social custom power. 
The lack of scrutiny and restriction on the arbitrator's decision, 
combined with the privacy and informality of arbitration, not 
only increases the likelihood that the arbitrator will indulge her 
biases and prejudices,371 but also decreases the parties' formal 
authority social custom power and resource social custom power. 
Fourth, arbitrators have no established ethical obligations, 
and there is no existing process for reviewing the competency of 
arbitrators or investigating complaints.372 Moreover, there is no 
requirement that a written record of an arbitral hearing be 
made. In fact, arbitrators are required and encouraged to make 
sure the disputes before them remain secret. 373 Therefore, the 
only existing check on arbitrator honesty is the arbitrator her-
self. 374 Thus, the parties have no true outlet for their complaints 
and suffer a concomitant loss of their already limited formal au-
thority social custom power and resource social custom power. 
Fifth, although the power to select an arbitrator is a unique 
source of formal authority social custom power, that power is not 
as efficacious as it first appears. Not only does this power cease 
once the selection is made, but also the parties' choice of an arbi-
trator often is limited. If the parties' contract does not specify a 
method of selecting an arbitrator, the judge will select one for 
them.375 If the parties have adopted the AAA's rules, a very 
common provision in contractual arbitration clauses, selection of 
arbitrators is particularly truncated. The AAA selects the arbi-
trator in matters involving less than $50,000.376 In matters in-
volving more than $50,000, the AAA sends each party a short 
370. Rau, supra note 348, at 2028 n.85. 
371. See supra notes 331-333 and accompanying text. 
372. See Reuben, supra note 349, at 56-57. 
373. See generally Phillip Rothman, Psst, Please Keep it ConfidentiaL· Arbitration 
Makes it Possible, 49 DISP. REsoL. J., Sept. 1994, at 69. 
374. Arbitrators are expected to self-monitor conflicts of interest. Reuben, supra 
note 349, at 55. 
375. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. PRoc. CoDE § 1281.6 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 682.04 (West 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.3 (West 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
Ch. 251, § 3 (West 1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 36.320 (1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 7.04.050 (West 1992). 
376. AMERICAN ARB. Ass'N CONSTR. INDUS. ARB. RULES§ 54(a), at 19 (1993). 
1997] POWER ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RELATIONS 139 
list from which to choose their arbitrator.377 The AAA makes 
no mention of a right to refuse all of the arbitrators. 378 These 
facts are particularly significant because there are no legally re-
quired qualifications to be or hold oneself out as an arbitrator.379 
Consequently, the arbitrator selection process actually may be a 
source of disempowerment for the parties because their choices 
are either very limited or nonexistent. 
Norms and values social custom power also plays an impor-
tant and complex role in the power ramifications of arbitration. 
The arbitrator gains power because the informality and secrecy 
of arbitration limit the effectiveness of the usual constraints that 
norms and values place on a decision maker. As Delgado et al. 
argue, arbitrators are more likely to prejudge and to be biased, 
racist, or sexist than are judges or juries.380 Moreover, unlike a 
judge, an arbitrator takes no oath.381 From a power standpoint, 
these facts indicate arbitrators possess greater power than judges 
because arbitrators are not restrained by social values and norms 
and arbitrating parties possess less power than they would have 
had if they had resorted to court adjudication.382 
Like a judge or jury, an arbitrator likely is perceived by the 
parties as trustworthy. The lack of social restraint suggested by 
Delgado et al. implies that, while the arbitrator possesses signifi-
cant perceived trustworthiness power, the parties may lack the in-
formation power to know that the arbitration process itself 
fosters arbitrator bias. 
Arbitrators possess a substantial amount of information 
power. In many arbitrations, the arbitrator possesses relevant 
knowledge of the industry or trade that is the context for the 
dispute. 383 In fact, the arbitrator may be perceived as an expert 
in the field that is the subject of the parties' dispute. The fact 
that the parties desire this expertise does not change the fact that 
377. Id. § 13, at 9. 
378. See, e.g., id. 
379. See, e.g., Robinson v. Superior Ct., 35 Cal. 2d 379, 387, 218 P.2d 10, 16 (1950). 
380. See Delgado et al., supra note 70, at 1388-89. 
381. See, e.g., 6 Cal. Jur. § 36, at 77 (3d. ed. 1988). 
382. This issue is one of degree. As Gabel and Harris argue, the formality of 
adjudication legitimizes the systematic repression of those who lack power by causing 
them to consider themselves beneath those who possess power. Gabel & Harris, supra 
note 69, at 372-73. 
383. Rau, supra note 348, at 2029. 
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it diminishes a usual source of party empowerment present in 
court adjudication, expert power. 
Moreover, the arbitrator can obtain additional information 
without any participation by the parties, a source of power that a 
judge lacks. In adjudication, the parties control the flow of in-
formation to the decision maker. In contrast, at least in Califor-
nia, an arbitrator may conduct an independent investigation of 
the facts, outside the presence of the parties and their counseP84 
The arbitrator also may consult with technical experts of her 
choosing385 and seek advice on legal issues from a disinterested 
attorney. 386 
These sources of power can supplement the arbitrator's al-
ready extensive discourse power because the arbitrator is en-
gaged in a form of agenda-setting. In addition, the arbitrator, 
like a judge, sets the scene for the parties' hearing. She controls 
the parties' and attorneys' conduct by her intermediate rulings· 
and decisions, and she may even possess a limited contempt 
power.387 She controls the number of arbitral hearings, in addi-
tion to the duration and progress of each day of the hearing. 388 
Unlike a judge, the arbitrator also may control the physical posi-
tioning of the parties, the formality of the proceedings, the man-
ner in which evidence is presented (e.g., by narrative or by 
question and answer), whether the parties and witnesses swear 
an oath, and even the location of the arbitral hearing.389 
Like a judge, the arbitrator rules on evidentiary issues. 
However, unlike a judge, the arbitrator may admit evidence that 
would be barred under current legal standards.390 This discre-
tion, widely exercised in arbitral hearings, also confers discourse 
384. See Canadian Indem. Co. v. Ohm, 271 Cal. App. 2d 703, 708-09, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
902, 905 (1969). But see Fred J. Brotherton, Inc. v. Kreielsheimer, 83 A.2d 707, 709 
(N.J. 1951); Goldfinger v. Lisker, 500 N.E.2d 857, 864 (N.Y. 1986). 
385. See, e.g., 1\vin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Platt Rogers, Inc. 147 P.2d 
828, 833 (Colo. 1944); Gord v. F.S. Harmon & Co., 188 Wash. 134, 61 P.2d 1294, 1297 
(1936). 
386. Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal. 2d 501, 506-07, 289 
P.2d. 476, 479 (1955). See also Litman v. Holtzman, 149 A.2d 385, 390 (Md. 1959). 
387. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE§ 1282.6 (West 1994). 
388. See, e.g., id. § 1282.2(a). 
389. A judge possesses a crucial source of power that an arbitrator lacks, direct 
access to force power. See generally supra note 94 and accompanying text. The arbitra-
tor can obtain access to force only if a judge becomes involved. · 
390. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PRoc. CoDE§ 1282.2(d) (West 1994); 0 & G/O'Connell 
Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partnership No. 3, 523 A.2d 1271, 1279 (Conn. 
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power on the arbitrator. Interestingly, it both confers and 
reduces the parties' discourse power. On the one hand, the par-
ties are not limited by evidence law. On the other hand, the lack 
of standards reduces predictability and, hence, control. Even 
confidential or privileged information may be disclosed, contrary 
to the parties' wishes.391 
Another source of information and discourse disempower-
ment of the parties stems from the fact that they cannot compel 
each other to disclose claims, defenses, witnesses, or evidence 
until the day of the hearing, when the arbitrator's subpoena 
power is least efficient. In addition, arbitration law requires no 
discovery in any form. 392 In fact, in California, if the amount of 
the claim is less than $50,000, neither party has to disclose the 
name or nature of any witnesses' testimony, including both 
percipient and expert witnesses.393 The lack of disclosure is a 
possible source of empowerment to a party inclined to hide in-
formation; however, each party can withhold key information. 
The lack of disclosure disempowers the parties by stripping them 
of information power. It also contributes to a decrease in the 
parties' formal authority social custom power to settle their dis-
pute because they cannot assess adequately the efficacy of their 
contentions. 
Consequently, the parties learn they have virtually no 
source of power or empowerment in arbitration. This fact cre-
ates a risk that the parties' normal reference power and personal 
qualities power may be diluted through the process of learned 
helplessness.394 This result seems likely because the lack of 
power may surprise the parties, who may enter the arbitration 
process believing that arbitration will empower them perhaps 
even more than would court adjudication. Their participation in 
arbitration, therefore, may reduce their confidence in the accu-
1987); Belanger v. Matteson, 346 A.2d 124, 137-38 (R.I. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 
{1976). See generally Hayford & Peeples, supra note 368, at 375-76. 
391. Schwartz, supra note 349, at 15. 
392. Drinane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 606 N.E.2d 1181, 1183 {Ill. 1992); 
Hendler & Murray P.C. v. Lambert, 511 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). See 
generally Brunet, supra note 349, at 12-13,33-34 (noting the lack of significant discovery 
in all forms of ADR and criticizing the very limited exchange of information allowed in 
connection with arbitration). 
393. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 1282.2 (West 1994). 
394. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
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racy of their perceptions. 395 
5. Summary: Application of the Power Model to Arbitration 
Arbitration skews the power relationship in unexpected 
ways. My concern with this power distortion is twofold. First, 
the lack of restraint on arbitrators increases arbitration's poten-
tial for harm. The risk of arbitration is that unchecked, exces-
sively powerful arbitrators will use their power to favor those 
who already possess power in our society. In other words, cases 
may be decided based on the arbitrators' bias or the incentive to 
decide cases in such a way as to maximize the possibility of re-
turn business. The privacy of arbitration makes these risks par-
ticularly disturbing. We can hypothesize that arbitrators reach 
poor, biased, and unprincipled results, but we cannot test our 
hypothesis. 
Second, these concerns are likely to be unknown to parties 
when they agree to be bound by arbitration. Kaiser's patients 
probably believed they would be treated better in arbitration. 
They may have assumed that arbitration is better because it is 
faster and cheaper than court adjudication. What parties to arbi-
trations often find, however, is alienation, bewilderment, and a 
sense of running around in circles. The circle begins with the 
idea that court adjudication is too expensive and favors those 
with greater power in society. It continues with the suggestion . 
that ADR, particularly arbitration, may be better. Finally, it re-
turns to the beginning with the reality that arbitration is no bet-
ter than adjudication and may actually be worse. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The doctrine of unconscionability and the assessment of ar-
bitration as a method of dispute resolution seem almost com-
pletely unconnected.396 Unconscionability is a doctrinal 
principle, requiring analysis of specific, case-by-case facts to re-
solve specific disputes. The assessment of arbitration is a ques-
tion of system analysis requiring consideration of standards by 
395. There are no personal qualities power and reference power issues endemic to 
the process of arbitration. Manipulation power is relevant only on a case-by-case basis. 
Finally, force power is rarely relevant in arbitration. 
396. The only obvious connection between the two is that an arbitration clause 
may be a product of gross inequality of power between one party who wants such a 
clause and another who does not. 
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which dispute systems can be measured and a determination of 
whether arbitration is an effective process for resolving disputes. 
Unconscionability law and the assessment of arbitration can 
be linked, although in a somewhat unexpected way. Procedur-
ally unconscionable contracts and arbitration procedures present 
problems with process that can produce problems with result. 
Unconscionability doctrine is a response to a concern with a spe-
cific type of bad result-unfair contracts. Courts of equity, then 
the drafters of the Restatement of Contracts, and, finally, the 
drafters of the U CC responded to this concern by developing 
doctrine that allows courts to consider the fairness of bargains. 
The notion of procedural unconscionability397 reflects a belief 
that unfair bargains usually are the product of unfair bargaining 
processes. Similarly, authors like Brunet, Fiss, Rueben, and Del-
gado argue that arbitration may produce bad, unfair, or biased 
results. This Article suggests that the undesirable results pro-
duced by arbitration are the product of an unfair process, a pro-
cess that greatly inflates the decision maker's power while 
deflating the parties' power. Taken together, unconscionability 
doctrine and the insights into arbitration offered in this Article 
suggest that distortions of power in a process may produce dis-
torted results. 
The purpose of this Article has been to expose the vectors 
of power to close examination. In addition, this Article demon-
strates the relevance of those vectors to the operation of legal 
doctrine and to the assessment of dispute resolution procedure. 
In so doing, the importance and pervasiveness of power is re-
vealed. Power clearly matters. 
We also can see the benefit of an in-depth, multivector 
model of power. In their contracts casebook, Professors Cran-
dall and Whaley tell law students that, "[u]nconscionability is a 
wild card doctrine in our law ... [and] ... unconscionability has 
been attacked as meaningless, untamable, [and] dangerous."398 
The language Crandall and Whaley chose-"wild," "untam-
able," "dangerous"-is too visceral to ignore. The image is one 
of a wild animal roaming the streets, to be feared and guarded 
against. 
397. See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text. 
398. THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS ON CoNTRAcrs 785 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). 
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Why is unconscionability perceived as being so threatening? 
The fear cannot stem from unconscionability's focus on bad bar-
gains; courts of equity have refused to enforce bad bargains for 
years.399 An answer may lie within the concept of power itself. 
As Foucault suggests, power is the continuation of force by other 
means.400 Power, in other words, maintains and reifies itself. As 
long as the consideration of power is an exception to a general 
discourse that favors preserving the existing system of contract, 
and as long as the few unconscionability cases that explicitly ad-
dress power do so superficially, there is no danger to the existing 
social structure. 
A discourse about the hegemony and prevalence of 
power-in contract making, dispute resolution, and other phases 
of human interaction-also can be seen as dangerous and un-
tamable, at least dangerous to current distributions of power in 
our society. It allows us to recognize that contracts and arbitra-
tion are part of an overarching institution through which power 
pervades our lives. It affords us the opportunity to confront that 
institution and ask whether another way might work better. For 
these reasons, I have proposed this model. Electrical power be-
came a tool for human benefit once it was understood; an under-
standing of the vectors of human power may not light up a room, 
but it might illuminate power operations otherwise invisible and, 
thereby, challenge the existing social structure. 
399. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
400. Foucault, supra note 9, at 89. 
